Adding Life to the Adolescent\u27s Years, Not Simply Years to the Adolescent\u27s Life: The Integration of the Individualized Care Planning & Coordination Model and a Statutory Fallback Provision by Gordy, Kimberly
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 
Volume 11 




Adding Life to the Adolescent's Years, Not Simply Years to the 
Adolescent's Life: The Integration of the Individualized Care 
Planning & Coordination Model and a Statutory Fallback Provision 
Kimberly Gordy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kimberly Gordy, Adding Life to the Adolescent's Years, Not Simply Years to the Adolescent's Life: The 
Integration of the Individualized Care Planning & Coordination Model and a Statutory Fallback Provision, 
11 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS (2011). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics by an authorized editor of Yale Law 
School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact julian.aiken@yale.edu. 
NOTE
Adding Life to the Adolescent's Years, Not Simply Years
to the Adolescent's Life: The Integration of the




I. A PINCH OF THIS, A SPRINKLE OF THAT: WHAT ARE ADOLESCENTS MADE
O F?........................................................... .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . .173
A. REDEFINING THE DEVELOPMENTAL EVALUATION OF INTRINSIC ASSETS. 174
1. ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE: THE PIAGET THEORY ............. 174
2. SOCIAL COGNITION AND A HEALTHY SELF-IMAGE........ ......... 176
B. THE MODERN DAY SECRET GARDEN: THE CRITICALLY ILL ADOLESCENT'S
OPPORTUNITY TO ATTAIN INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL SKILLS...................177
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF A WORKABLE CONCEPT OF DEATH... ........... 179
II. THE FAMILY UNIT: UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTING THE PROGNOSIS180
A. IMPAIRED PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY ................. 184
B. A GESTALT ENTITY: UNDERSTANDING PROGNOSIS THROUGH INTUITION
AND EXPERIENCE...................................................186
III. THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ADOLESCENT DECISION
M AKING ................................................................................................. 188
A. THE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS - FROM THE IMPRACTICAL TO THE
UNPREDICTABLE..................................................189
* J.D., University of Houston Law Center, 2010; B.S., Texas A&M University, 2007; Editor-
in-Chief, Board 33, Houston Journal of International Law. Many thanks to Dr. Javier Kane,
Director of the Palliative Medicine & End of Life Care Program at St. Jude Children's Research
Hospital, for generously sharing his resources and expertise; to Dr. Donna Follansbee, Research
Consultant at The Barbara Davis Center for Childhood Diabetes, for her invaluable information on
chronically ill adolescents; and to Dr. William Winslade with the University of Houston Law
Center and The Institute for the Medical Humanities at the University of Texas Biomedical Branch
for his feedback on this Note.
169
1
Gordy: Adding Life to the Adolescent's Years, Not Simply Years to the Adolescent's Life
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
1. STATUS-BASED EXCEPTIONS ............................. ........ 189
2. THE SUPREME COURT AS AN ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGIST................. 191
3. THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE .................... .. .......... 194
B. WHAT THE PEDIATRIC TEAM KNOWS: THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY'S
RECOMMENDATION ................................................ 201
IV. IN THE TRENCHES: THE ICPC/STATUTORY COMBINATION MODEL AT
W ORK .................................................................................................... 204
A. THE INDIVIDUALIZED CARE PLANNING & COORDINATION MODEL ......... 204
1. PHASE I: RELATIONSHIP .................................. ...... 205
2. PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION ........................................ 209
3. PHASE 3: THE INDIVIDUALIZED CARE COORDINATION PLAN PROCESS 211





Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss1/7
ADDING LIFE TO THE ADOLESCENT'S YEARS
INTRODUCTION
Yesterday Tyler had friends over playing x-box and rock band. They were
laughing, joking, and the biggest question on their minds was will tomorrow be
a snow day. Today Tyler is surrounded by a team of nurses and doctors
injecting 5 different toxic chemotherapy drugs directly into his heart . . . . By
5:00 the side effects had already begun. I am continually amazed at how
smoothly Tyler makes the transition between these two worlds. It is a sign of
great strength and maturity. He does a far better job than I do . . . . It is an
amazing and humbling thing when your greatest life lesson is taught to you by
your own teenage son.
The above passage was written by the parent of seventeen-year-old Tyler
Alfriend, a patient with stage IV Burkitt's Lymphoma and Leukemia. Tyler's
ability to balance these opposing worlds exemplifies the dignity and maturity
exhibited by so many teenage patients coping with critical illness. For these
young adults, their teen years are not the jaunty bridge between childhood and
adulthood, a time during which teens discover their world without regard for
mature considerations. Instead, the reality of their illness often results in
fulminant entry into adulthood. While coping with the realization that they may
not reach their next birthday, these teens also assume the responsibility of
assuaging the grief of their families. Although there is never a good time in one's
life to face a life-threatening illness, experts have recognized that the adolescent
years may be among the hardest.2
Many physicians admit that critically ill adolescent patients are in a relative
"no man's land."3 In many ways, adolescent patients are like pediatric patients,
needing both emotional and physical support from their families. However, these
patients are not children, and the maturity demonstrated by many teens warrants
the medical decision-making autonomy given to adult patients. Take the case of
Michael Miller, who at age sixteen was diagnosed with cancer so advanced that
4his treatment included fifty-one weeks of chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery.
In the wake of his diagnosis and his parent's admitted hopelessness, Michael's
physician stated that Michael showed maturity when he "calmed his parents'
fears and helped them focus on the task ahead."
1. Kyle Alfriend, Round 5, TYLER ALFRIEND-FIGHT TO WIN! A TEENAGERS VICTORY
AGAINST BURKITT'S LYMPHOMA/LEUKEMIA (Mar. 10, 2008, 21:30 EST), http://tyleralfriend
.blogspot.com/2008/03/round-5.html.
2. Cf Roni Caryn Rabin, In Cancer Fight, Teenagers Don't Fit In, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010,
at DI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/16canc.html (discussing the
difficulties facing teenage cancer patients).
3. See, e.g., id; see also Rachel Hollis & Sue Morgan, The Adolescent with Cancer at the
Edge ofNo-Man's Land, 2 LANCET ONCOLOGY 43, 43 (2001).
4. Elizabeth Jane Walker, Roll Model: With Help from St. Jude, Michael Miller Transcends
Obstacles in His Way, PROMISE, Autumn 2009, at 6, available at http://www.stjude.org/
SJFile/Autumn09Prom.pdf.
5. Id. at 8.
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In a groundbreaking study conducted at St. Jude Children's Research
Hospital, researchers produced data supporting what Michael Miller's physician
already knew-that critically ill adolescents do have the ability to negotiate the
complex medical decision-making process." 6 The adolescent study's participants
both understood the consequences of their decisions and were capable of
participating in a decision process involving risks to themselves and to others.
In spite of their evident developmental maturity, American adolescents lack
the legal standing to apply these skills. As a result, the final months of their lives
are often fraught with conflicts over decision-making autonomy, with the most
severe conflicts necessitating judicial resolution. Although practitioners are
aware of the "no man's land" that is adolescent critical illness, the available
scholarship does not adequately address this significant bioethical conflict. As
advances in medicine superannuate the current decision-making framework, this
void in scholarship has never been more apparent. The current medical literature
is limited by the assumption that a legal intervention is unnecessary so long as a
8trusting relationship between the doctor, patient, and family is maintained. In
reality, few physicians are equipped to manage a teen's end-of-life care, and the
family often feels abandoned by the care team in the patient's final weeks. 9
Equally insufficient, the available law review literature focuses primarily on the
public health rights of teens, such as a minor's right to seek an abortion.
Unfortunately, the standards and arguments for these issues do not translate to a
teen facing cancer or muscular dystrophy. Although a limited number of pieces
offer an analysis of the common law mature minor doctrine,' 0 these articles do
not consider whether legal intervention is truly in the patient's best interest. Nor
does the current literature offer a process designed to elucidate the adolescent
patient's wishes without increasing conflicts arising from family disagreements,
poor communication, and disjointed clinical care.11 This Note overcomes these
deficiencies by presenting a formalized process that integrates the expertise of
the medical community with the resources of the legal system.
The proposed process is dependent upon a careful assessment of both the
adolescent's personal wishes and the family's dynamics, followed by a
negotiation process and the development of a comprehensive plan. This Note
6. See Pamela S. Hinds et al., End-of-Life Care Preferences of Pediatric Patients with Cancer,
23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 9146, 9153 (2005).
7. Id. at 9146.
8. COMM. ON PALLIATIVE AND END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, WHEN
CHILDREN DIE: IMPROVING PALLIATIVE AND END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
327 (Marilyn J. Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2003) [hereinafter WHEN CHILDREN DIE] (noting
that promoting trust is a strategy for handling conflicts).
9. See id at 328, 334.
10. See, e.g., Christophe Lemmens, End-of-Life Decisions and Minors: Do Minors Have the
Right To Refuse Life Preserving Medical Treatment? A Comparative Study, 28 MED. & L. 479
(2009).
11. See id at 293 (noting that cultural misunderstandings, poor communication, and deficient
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recommends conducting an individualized assessment of each adolescent patient
to ensure that he or she receives the appropriate level of autonomy needed to feel
12
at peace with his or her condition, family, and care team. By initiating
communications long before the patient's imminent death, those conflicts which
most often require judicial intervention will be identified by the medical team
and family prior to the point of crisis. Legal intervention becomes the final option
only if no other agreement can be reached.
This Note aims first to prove the benefits of individualized patient care, and
second, to recommend a model to better implement this heightened level of
patient-centered medicine. Part II argues that an adolescent's intrinsic assets are a
more accurate tool for assessing a critically ill teen's maturity, and explains that
critically ill minors are often better equipped to make well-conceived medical
decisions than many healthy adults. Part III enumerates the limitations of a
parent's decision-making capacity when faced with decisions about their
critically ill child and the use of life-sustaining medical treatment (LSMT).13 Part
IV asserts that the current legal health care exceptions for minors are
inappropriate when applied to critically ill adolescents. Finally, this Note
advocates an individualized approach to adolescent medical decision making and
recommends use of the Individualized Care Planning and Coordination Model
(ICPC). The ICPC model, developed at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, is
a comprehensive yet compassionate tri-phase approach to advance care
planning.14 This Note both builds on the ICPC model and recommends that state
legislatures adopt a statutory fallback provision to guide adolescent medical
decision making.
I. A PINCH OF THIS, A SPRINKLE OF THAT: WHAT ARE ADOLESCENTS MADE OF?
Because one must initially understand adolescent development before
appreciating adolescent autonomy, this Part discusses how development relates to
12. See generally Javier R. Kane & Joanne Hilden, Tools To Aid Decision Making in the Care
of Pediatric Patients with Cancer, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUCATIONAL
BOOK 188-89 (2007) (offering a thorough discussion of the importance of individualized care).
13. For the purposes of this Note, LSMT encompasses any treatment that could possibly delay
a patient's imminent death in the foreseeable future. This includes well-known treatments such as
ventilator support, cardio pulmonary resuscitation, antibiotics, artificial nutrition and hydration, and
dialysis. This Note also discusses participation in a clinical trial, including the use of experimental
chemotherapy for terminal cancer patients. Like LSMT, the treatment protocol in a Phase I clinical
trial will not cure the patient. However, trial participation differs because such treatment may
actually shorten the patient's lifespan. The purpose of a Phase I clinical trial is to evaluate a new
drug or treatment course to determine the maximum tolerable dose, any toxicities, and the
metabolism and elimination of the drug (pharmacokinetics). See Mason C. Bond & Sheila
Pritchard, Understanding Clinical Trials in Childhood Cancer, 11 PEDIATRIC CHILD HEALTH 148,
148-49 (2006). Eligible participants have typically received, but not responded to the standard
treatment protocol. The curative efficacy of the treatment is not evaluated at this stage. See id.
14. See Kane & Hilden, supra note 12, at 190. See St. Jude Children's Research Hospital,
http://www.stjude.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2010), for general information on the hospital.
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adolescent maturity. Applying proven theories of developmental psychology, the
following Part redefines the manner in which an adolescent's maturity and
decision-making ability should be evaluated. By eliminating the disadvantages of
previous capacity assessments, the forthcoming discussion of the use of intrinsic
assets to gauge maturity creates a more accurate assessment of a critically ill
teen's maturity level. Next, these developmental assets are considered in the
context of the critically ill minor, explaining why many critically ill minors are
better equipped to make a well-conceived medical decision than are many
healthy adults.
A. Redefining the Developmental Evaluation ofIntrinsic Assets
Society tends to measure an individual's development by the achievement of
external milestones. For example, seventy-two percent of Americans surveyed
consider the completion of school to be the milestone signifying the end of
adolescence and the beginning of adulthood. After graduation, Americans were
more likely to rank full time employment and beginning a family to be
milestones signifying maturity.16 However, for the three thousand teens that die
annually from chronic illnesses, these achievements are either impractical or
impossible.17 While these external milestones may signify adulthood, they are
neither necessary nor sufficient for emotional and intellectual maturity. Rather,
external milestones are a byproduct of an adolescent's intrinsic development-in
other words, the ability to both reason as an adult and interact successfully with a
peer group.
When evaluating maturity, a terminally ill teen's achievements should never
be compared to those of their healthy peers. Teens should be assessed
intrinsically to determine if they are functioning as successful young adults,
albeit within the confines of their illness. The essential question is: but for the
limitations of the illness, has the teen demonstrated the attainment of
independence and appropriate social cognition necessary to prove an attainment
of maturity? 18
1. Attainment ofIndependence: The Piaget Theory
As adolescents progress through their teen years, developmentalists expect a
15. Paul Arshagouni, "But I'm an Adult Now.. . Sort of': Adolescent Consent in Health Care
Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'Y 315, 317 (2006); Tom
W. Smith, Coming of Age in Twenty-First Century America: Public Attitudes Towards the
Importance and Timing of Transitions to Adulthood, 29 AGEING INT'L 136, 138 (2004).
16. See Smith, supra note 15, at 138-139.
17. David R. Freyer, Care of the Dying Adolescent: Special Considerations, 113 PEDIATRICS
381,381 (2004).
18. Id. at 381-82 (noting that life-threatening illness alters the normal physical and
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gradual separation from the family unit. An emotionally healthy adolescent
adopts a future-oriented view of the world, marked equally by a sense of
individuality and a concern for others.19 According to the Piagetian theory of
development, this enhanced thought-process occurs because the teen has reached
the formal operations stage, or the final stage of development. 20 Unlike younger
children, teenagers have the capacity to think about the future, the abstract, and
the hypothetical. Having this capacity signifies that they have reached the Piaget
stage of formal operations."21 As the ability to reason is a component of maturity,
it is important to understand how the use of formal operations allows a teen,
unlike a child, to consider many different alternatives at once. The following is
an example of the difference in the reasoning ability of a child compared to that
of an adolescent: A person is presented with five jars, each containing a colorless
liquid. He or she is told that combining the liquids from three particular jars will
produce a color, whereas using the liquid from either of the two remaining jars
will not produce a color. A color can be produced, but he or she is not shown
which combination produces this effect. Children at the concrete-operational
stage typically try to solve this problem by combining liquids two at a time, but
after combining all pairs, or possibly trying to mix all five liquids together, their
search for the workable combination usually stops. An adolescent at the formal-
operational stage, on the other hand, will explore all possible solutions,
systematically testing all possible combinations of two and three liquids until a
color is produced.22 Just as adolescents can explore all possible solutions to make
the color change, they are able to weigh all proposed treatment options and the
consequences of selecting or rejecting the various choices presented by the
physician. Having reached formal operations, the teen fosters an inner moral
compass and utilizes deductive reasoning skills on a daily basis to make
decisions.23 Teens able to reason in this manner will have the ability to choose
their path after a weighted evaluation. This new perspective allows the teen to
foresee a life apart from his or her parents. Despite the egocentrism associated
with this stage, this expression of autonomy is essential for establishing self-
19. Id. at 382.
20. DOROTHY G. SINGER & TRACEY A. REVENSON, A PIAGET PRIMER: HOW A CHILD THINKS 26
(1996). The Piagetian theory of development has been applied by psychologists for decades and is a
well-accepted measure of development. The four stages are (1) Sensory Motor, (2) Preoperational,
(3) Operation, and (4) Formal. Although the Piagetian theories have been expanded and
modernized over time, the core concepts remain in use by developmental psychologists. Id. at 20-
26.
21. Id. at 26. Cf Marc H. Bornstein et al., Human Behavior, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA
ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/275332/human-behaviour (last visited Oct. 7,
2010) (explaining that Jean Piaget's fourth and final stage of formal operations is when an
adolescent operates as an adult).
22. See Bornstein, supra note 21 ("[A]ccording to Piaget, children organize and adapt their
experiences with objects into increasingly sophisticated cognitive models that enable them to deal
with future situations in more effective ways.").
23. See SINGER & REVENSON, supra note 20, at 26.
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confidence and integrity.
2. Social Cognition and a Healthy Self-Image
The development of social cognition is concomitant with a healthy self-
image.25 This process takes place over the course of three sub-stages across the
span of adolescence.26 During early adolescence, ages ten to fourteen, the overall
cognitive focus shifts one's attachment from parents to peers.27 During middle
adolescence, ages fifteen to seventeen, a teen's social development requires the
consolidation of self-image and feelings of both achievement and power.28
Middle adolescents also begin experimenting with ideas, friendships, and the way
they present themselves to society.29 This psychosocial process is referred to as
role diffusion versus identity.30 Role diffusion describes the process by which
teens "try on" different personalities until they find their true self.31 A physically
healthy adolescent may experiment with styles and different peer groups in an
effort to gain acceptance. A teen's identity is composed of his or her self-
concept, task behavior, and perceived peer acceptance. 33 Although this
perception may or may not be accurate, projection is a common phenomenon
during the adolescent period. Younger teens typically interpret the actions and
attitudes of their peers as a reflection of their own self-worth and self-image. 34
During the period of late adolescence, teens enjoy a greater sense of security in
who they are and in their relationships with others.35 The teen fosters an
"appreciation for meaningful relationships" and is acutely attuned to the
dynamics within peer and family units.36 This new appreciation gives them the
24. See id ("[I]n the formal operations stage, adolescents now ha[ve] the necessary 'mental
tools' for living life.").
25. Cognition is defined as: "The mental activities such as thinking, reasoning, remembering,
perceiving. The process by which the seemingly random information presented by the
environmental and social stimuli around a person is organized into meaningful units for memory
and ultimate action." Id. at 127-28.
26. Freyer, supra note 17, at 381.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. See id at 382 (noting that teens are able to consolidate these social processes because they
have developed advanced abstract reasoning).
30. Cf DONNA L. WONG, WONG & WHALEY'S CLINICAL MANUAL OF PEDIATRIC NURSING 271
(4th ed. 1996) (identifying the stage of adolescent patient development as one of identity versus
role diffusion).
31. See Jennifer Wagaman, Psychosocial Development of Adolescents: Two Stages of
Development as Described by Erik Erikson, SUITE101.coM, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://parentingteens.suitel01.com/article.cfm/psychosocialdevelopment of adolescents.
32. Id.
33. Id Task behavior refers to what activities people choose to become involved in. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Freyer, supra note 17, at 381-82.
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opportunity to become socially adept and independent.
B. The Modern Day Secret Garden: The Critically Ill Adolescent's Opportunity
to Attain Independence and Social Skills
In The Secret Garden, "sickly" teen Colin Craven achieves normal
emotional development after having had the opportunity to interact with peers
and take on responsibility. 37 His "coming of age" depends upon his achieving
normal social relationships and ending the isolation imposed on him by his
caregivers. Like this classic character's, a critically ill teen's coming of age is not
dependent upon his or her physical health, but is instead influenced by the
strength and normalcy of his or her social relationships. When critically ill
teens are not exposed to the interactions necessary to facilitate this
developmental growth, it is possible that these teens will reach developmental
stages later than their peers.
For the critically ill teen, the desire for independence constantly conflicts
with the reality of needing constant care from family and medical
professionals. 40 The prolonged hospital stays and frequent outpatient treatments
can prevent a teen from attending school, participating in extracurricular
activities, or forming romantic relationships.41 Ultimately, overprotective parents
and isolation from peers prevent teens from experiencing the necessary internal
conflict of identity versus role diffusion.42 These limitations support the belief
that critically ill teens are less mature than their healthy counterparts.
Fortunately, psychosocial impairment does not have to be a side effect of
critical illness. A recent study of teens receiving treatment for cancer in the first
remission found that the patients were mostly well-adjusted when compared to
their healthy peers. 43 Adolescent patients that receive age-appropriate social
support are best enabled to follow as typical a developmental trajectory as
awareness of others, and appreciation for meaningful relationships").
37. See generally Frances Hodgson Burnett, THE SECRET GARDEN (1998) (1911).
38. See Freyer, supra note 17, at 381-82, 386-87.
39. See Danai Papadatou & Judith M. Stillion, Suffer the Children: An Examination of
Psychosocial Issues in Children and Adolescents with Terminal Illness, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
299, 299-315 (2002). ("Seriously ill children may find that either because of disease or treatment
side effects ... peers may begin to shun them .... [T]hey may not be able to take part in normal
childhood activities . . . .").
40. Freyer, supra note 17, at 382.
41. See id
42. See WONG, supra note 30, at 271 (mentioning the internal conflicts that accompany an
adolescent patient struggling with identity versus role diffusion); Sarah J. Sinclair, Involvement of
Adolescents in Decision Making for Heart Transplants, 34 AM. J. MATERNAL/CHILD NURSING 276,
278, 280 (2009) (noting the importance of positive peer influences and the need for open
communication).
43. Freyer, supra note 17, at 382 (citing R.B. Noll et al., Social, Emotional, and Behavioral
Functioning of Children with Cancer, 103 PEDIATRICS 71, 71-78 (1999)).
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possible.44
Psychosocial support is often provided by in-hospital intervention programs,
such as Child Life Services, or targeted experiences, including those provided by
specialized camps for teens with chronic illnesses.45 Child Life Services are
available in most major pediatric centers. This service serves both inpatients and
outpatients, and often directs the in-hospital school program and oversees the
emotional transition from hospital to home.46 All child life specialists have
earned a minimum bachelor's degree and are trained to provide psychosocial
support to pediatric and adolescent patients and their families. The child life
specialist facilitates the learning process by which the teen becomes informed
about the condition and prognosis, and customizes the information for the teen's
level of development. 47 For example, older teens are encouraged to talk and learn
about the illness through support groups and scientific literature.48 The activities
require the use of formal operations, and therefore challenge the teen both
emotionally and intellectually.49 To aid in the development of identity, the child
life specialist will often require the patient to find a hobby, such as watercolor
painting or learning a foreign language.50 If the teen was previously involved in
an activity, the care team would insist that the teen continue nurturing the
established talent.5 '
It is imperative that hospitalized adolescents participate in both the
adolescent life program and the in-hospital school program in order to develop
normal social cognition.52 These programs create opportunities for teens to form
friendships with other patients, mirroring the peer interaction they would receive
were they able to attend school. The child life team is also instrumental in
helping patients preserve out-of-hospital friendships.53 Because many teens are
44. Id. at 386-87 (describing how social support and guidance can help adolescent patients
experience meaningful events and relationships that may otherwise have been foreclosed to them).
45. Alyssa Quintero, MDA Summer Camp, QUEST, Mar./Apr. 2005, http://www.mda.org/
publications/Quest/ ql22goldenmemories.html; Association of Hole in the Wall Camps,
http://www.holeinthewallcamps.org/Page.aspx?pid=332 (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
46. See generally Child Life Council, the Child Life Profession,
http://www.childlife.org/The%20Child%20Life%20Profession (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
47. Id. ("All certified Child Life Specialists must complete a supervised 480-hour clinical
internship, pass a national examination, and adhere to a minimum standard for continued
professional development in order to maintain their certification.").
48. See id
49. See SINGER & REVENSON, supra note 20, at 26-27, 127 (explaining formal operations).
50. Children's Hosp. & Research Ctr. Oakland, Child Life Services,
http://www.childrenshospitaloakland.org/childlife/lifeoverview.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
51. Id. See Christy Price Rabetoy, The Benefits of a School Teacher vs. a Child Life Specialist
Serving Pediatric Patients on Dialysis, 35 NEPHROLOGY NURSING J. 399, 399-401 (2008).
52. See generally Child Life Council & Comm. on Hosp. Care, Policy Statement: Child Life
Services, 118 PEDIATRICS 1757, 1757-61 (2006) (providing a thorough description of child and
adolescent life services and advocating that these services should be considered an essential
component of quality pediatric health care).
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apprehensive about peers visiting them in the hospital, the team provides "cool"
activities, such as Wii games to help the adolescent bridge the gap between
54
patient and peer.
Camps designed for patients facing illness are especially important for
developing age-appropriate maturity, as they facilitate the formation of their
intrinsic developmental assets.ss Participants experience the same activities that
their healthy peers engage in during summer camp and have the opportunity to
form meaningful relationships without the fear of peer rejection.56 The most
important component, however, is independence.57 Teens are separated from
their parents, accountable for their own enjoyment, and must independently
perform as many daily tasks as physically possible. 5
Each of the programs described above provides opportunities for increased
self-awareness and reliance. The incorporation of problem solving and self-
evaluation in these specialized activities forces ill teenagers to employ formal
operations in the same manner that their healthy peers apply formal operations in
school or extra-curricular activities.59 While the physical development of a
critically ill adolescent may be altered by illness, emotional maturity can be
achieved with appropriate interventions. 60
C. The Importance of a Workable Concept ofDeath
As children move into adolescence, their beliefs about death evolve from
perceiving it as temporary and reversible to understanding death to be universal,
unalterable, and permanent. 61 A workable concept of death, an important
developmental step, is perhaps the most important asset needed for mature
medical decision making.62 The realization and understanding of a workable
concept of death is determined by an individual's personal encounters with
54. See Georgetown Pediatrics, Child Life Program, http://www.georgetownuniversityhospital
.org/body.cfm?id=557459 (last visited Jan. 4, 2010); see generally Child Life Council & Comm. on
Hosp. Care, supra note 52, at 1757-61; Beth Israel Medical Center's Child Life Program Receives
Support From the Startlight Starbright Children's Foundation, http://www.wehealny.org/pressroom/
starlight starbright intern.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
55. Alyssa Quintero, MDA Summer Camp, QUEST, Mar./Apr. 2005, http://www.mda.org/
publications/Quest/ ql22golden memories.html ("Camp is still so important because it gives the
campers a sense of learning in terms of how to share and how to have patience. It's a great chance
to learn about what life is really like.").
56. Id.
57. Association of Hole in the Wall Camps, http://www.holeinthewallcamps.org/
Page.aspx?pid=332 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
58. Id.
59. See generally Child Life Council & Comm. on Hosp. Care, supra note 52, at 1757-61
(describing the intellectual and social value of Child Life services).
60. Freyer, supra note 17, at 382 (noting that the physical changes associate with puberty are
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death.63 A healthy adolescent's experience with death is typically the demise of a
grandparent or pet. Although this can be a profound loss, exposure to the dying
64process is often limited and thus death remains largely external in nature.
Unlike their healthy peers, adolescents with a life-limiting illness will have
developed an astute understanding of their own impending death as "the
cumulative result of personal experiences with serious illness and medical
treatment."65 These teens have also experienced the death of friends, and thus
fully understand the consequences of disease, treatment, and grief.66 Death is
understood not only in terms of its personal significance but also in the way it
will affect their friends and family. 67
II. THE FAMILY UNIT: UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTING THE PROGNOSIS
Why would I want a tube in my throat? I saw other patients like that-I don't
want that. I wouldn't be able to talk with my family or hold my Mom's hand.
That is not living.
15-year-old young woman with acute lymphoblastic leukemia68
We were kind of really happy that they had chemotherapy, something else that
we could try.
15-year-old young woman with a solid tumor69
We decided not to go with chemo because I don't want to be sick the rest of my
days, and it's not like it is going to cure me, so I just said, 'we'll go home and
take it from there.'
15-year-old young woman with acute lymphoblastic leukemia70
Pediatric palliative care is a uniquely challenging field and can be




66. See id. (explaining that understanding death requires actual experiences with death,
whereas many children are insulated from the dying process and only witness death in movies and
video games).
67. Id. (highlighting the importance of a critically ill patient's understanding of death).
68. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9150.
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Tammy 1. Kang, David Munson & Jeffrey C. Klick, Preface, Pediatric Palliative Care, 54
PEDIATRIC CLINics N. AM. xv, xv-xvi (2007). Palliative care is defined as "the active total care of
patients whose disease is not responsive to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms,
and of psychological, social, and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of palliative care is
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of facilitating medical decision making often falls on the pediatric palliative care
team, and this team must be both sensitive to the patient's wishes and cognizant
of the family dynamics in order to provide the patient with a positive "experience
of life despite the sadness of an untimely death." 72 This Part explains the
difficulties faced by the care team, parents, and the patient when there is no
longer a realistic hope for a cure. Section A examines the reasons behind the
parents' choice to continue treatment with a curative intent and the challenges
providers face in effectively communicating prognosis. Section B explains why
the patient's acceptance of prognosis is a gestalt entity, comprising both intuition
and past medical experiences.
To ensure a thorough understanding of the prognosis, the palliative team has
three responsibilities to a patient following a dying trajectory. 73 First, the patient
and family must receive accurate and timely information on the diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment options. 74 Second, when the initial or subsequent
treatments fail, the team must provide information about the burdens and benefits
of the remaining treatment options and prognosis.7 5 Third, when further life-
prolonging interventions fail, the care team must then support the patient through
the dying phase of the illness, as well as ensure that the family has support during
and after the patient's death. 76
When an adolescent has an illness that is life-limiting by nature or that has
progressed beyond the possibility of a cure, the condition will take on one of two
trajectories.7 7 Understanding which trajectory the course of illness will take
impacts the amount of preparation time the patient and family will have and
underscores the importance of tailoring care to the specific course of illness. 78
The first trajectory represents patients who have a fatal progressive
condition, such as muscular dystrophy or cystic fibrosis. 79 These types of
conditions are characterized by periods of slowly deteriorating health status,
interrupted by potentially fatal medical crises.80 The patient repeatedly survives
until one crisis results in death. Because treatments are successful until the one
72. Freyer, supra note 17, at 387.
73. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 75. The article lists four possible trajectories;
however, the sudden, unexpected death trajectory (e.g., car crash, SIDS) and the death from lethal
congenital anomaly (e.g., condition leading to death immediately following birth) are beyond the




77. Id. at 73-74.
78. Id. at 73.
79. Id. Approximately forty-five percent of the Cystic Fibrosis patient population is age
eighteen or older. Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, About Cystic Fibrosis: Statistics, http://www.cff.org/
AboutCF (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).




Gordy: Adding Life to the Adolescent's Years, Not Simply Years to the Adolescent's Life
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
time they are not, this rollercoaster trajectory may cause patients, parents, and
even medical professionals to feel unprepared for the final failure of treatment. 82
However, early recognition that the patient has reached the final stage of his or
her illness allows the goal of care to shift to maintaining physical and emotional
comfort.83 The turning point is often when life-sustaining medical treatment is
more burdensome than beneficial.84
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), affecting males only, is one such
disease that follows this dying trajectory. It occurs as a result of mutations in the
dystrophin gene, and these mutations result in progressive muscle degeneration.85
DMD, by its very nature, is an insidious disorder because patients with DMD
typically do not demonstrate symptoms until ages two or three years old. 8 6 Most
patients are diagnosed at five years old, typically after parents observe delayed
developmental milestones or abnormal muscle function in the child.87 As the
young man enters his early teens, the muscles of the respiratory system begin to
decline, leading to a need, first for non-invasive ventilation, and then for invasive
ventilation via a tracheostomy as DMD progresses. Young adults with DMD
often suffer heart failure in their teens, and DMD is typically fatal during their
teens or twenties. 89 Nevertheless, the fatal prognosis in no way means the young
man should be treated as an invalid. For example:
[The young man] may not need a wheelchair until sometime between the ages
of 10 and 12, and even then may not need it full time, but [parents] may want to
prepare him for this eventuality ahead of time. If the child senses that a
wheelchair is something the parents have long dreaded or that every therapy
has been directed at "keeping him out of a wheelchair," then the event almost
has to seem like a defeat.90
The finality of this trajectory requires that families respectfully acknowledge that
the disease will continue to progress despite the patient's efforts to "fight." 91
Because the progression of this disease is unavoidable, it is vital that families
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 76.
85. Katherine Bushby et al., Diagnosis and Management ofDuchenne Muscular Dystrophy,
part 1: Diagnosis, and Pharmacological and Psychosocial Management, 9 LANCET NEUROLOGY
77, 77 (2010).
86. Muscular Dystrophy Association, Journey of Love: A Parent's Guide to Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy, ch. 2, http://www.mda.org/publications/journey/2-2.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2010) (noting that the first signs often appear innocuous, such as difficulty transferring from a
seated position to a standing position).
87. Bushby, supra note 85, at 81.
88. Muscular Dystrophy Association, supra note 86, ch. 4, http://www.mda.org/publications/
journey/intro.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
89. Id. ch. 10.
90. Id. ch. 4.
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understand the ultimate prognosis.92
The second trajectory outlines the patient with a potentially curable disease,
such as cancer, who initially responds to treatment but eventually dies of the
disease or its further treatment. Typically, the patient responds positively to
aggressive and possibly life-threatening treatment and may receive a favorable
prognosis.94 However, in the event of a relapse, the patient must then decide if he
or she wishes to continue treatment with a curative intent. 95
Patients receiving stem cell transplantation (SCT) often follow the second
dying trajectory.96 Although the overall cure rate of childhood cancer is 70%, the
survival rate for patients needing pediatric SCT is much lower.97 Patients
receiving this treatment modality experience a significant decrease in their
quality of life, and families often struggle with the uncertain prognosis.98 For
example, patients with acute myeloid leukemia (AML), have a 40% to 60% five-
year survival rate.99 However, after a relapse, the survival rate is reduced to
25%. 100 As previously noted, patients on the second trajectory often die of the
treatment itself.101
Morbidity during the immediate transplantation period is significant, with
patients experiencing mucositis, pain, veno-occlusive disease, and respiratory
complications. These children are also more likely to die of treatment-related
complications than are those who die secondary to a malignancy but without
transplantation as part of their treatment. Furthermore, patients, family
members, and their clinicians experience significant physical, emotional, and
spiritual distress. 102
92. Id. (illustrating that families should avoid imposing expectations on the child that will
result in his feeling like a "failure").
93. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 75.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See Justin N. Baker et al., A Process To Facilitate Decision Making in Pediatric Stem Cell
Transplantation: The Individualized Care Planning and Coordination Model, 13 BIOLOGY BLOOD
& MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 245, 245 (2007) [hereinafter ICPC 1]; see also WHEN CHILDREN
DIE, supra note 8.
97. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 75; ICPC 1, supra note 96, at 245.
98. ICPC 1, supra note 96, at 245-46.
99. Id. at 245-46 (describing survival rates for patients receiving allogenic stem cell
transplants). This is from a sibling or parent; an unrelated donor may also be used. See National
Cancer Institute, Bone Marrow Transplantation and Peripheral Blood Stem Cell Transplantation,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Therapy/bone-marrow-transplant (last visited Nov. 9,
2009).
100. ICPC I, supra note 96, at 246 (illustrating the poor survival rate associated with relapse in
patients initially treated with allogenic transplantation).
101. Id (noting that these patients are more likely to die of treatment-related complications
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The above information and clinical examples illustrate the importance of
prognostication in medical decision making. Unrealistic prognostic expectations
may lead families to ask for medically inappropriate interventions that create
"inescapable suffering" and offer no curative benefit. 103 These unrealistic
expectations are the primary source of contention between the adolescent patient,
the parents, and the care team. 104
A. Impaired Parental Decision-Making Capacity
Parents are often the most reluctant to accept a child's fatal prognosis.los
Despite the fact that earlier parental recognition of this prognosis is associated
with a greater treatment emphasis on reducing patient suffering, most families
remain hopeful that their child will be the one to "beat the odds." There is a
considerable delay in recognizing that their child has no realistic chance for a
cure.106 The realization that a child will not survive comes to each parent
differently, and is referred to as the "parent-defined end-of-life care period." 07 In
the majority of cases, the physician documented that the patient entered the end-
of-life care period three months before the parent-defined end-of-life care
period. os For example, in a recent study surveying the parents of children who
died from cancer, the first recognition that the child had no realistic chance for
survival occurred, on average, 106 days prior to death.109 In contrast, the
physician first documented that the patient had begun a dying trajectory 206 days
prior to death.1 lo
The majority of patients in this study had previously undergone the standard
treatment for their cancer. At the time of the study, 74% of patients were enrolled
in a research protocol.'' 1 Although most parents remembered the care team
discussing the fact that their child had no realistic chance for cure, less than half
of these parents reported understanding that their child's condition was terminal
through this discussion.112 As a result of this research, palliative care teams must
now be aware that a formal discussion is not an effective means of
communication for more than half of these families." 3
103. Id.
104. See id. at 246-50.
105. Joanne Wolfe et al., Understanding of Prognosis Among Parents of Children Who Died
of Cancer: Impact on Treatment Goals and Integration of Palliative Care, 284 JAMA 2469, 2469
(2000).
106. Id
107. Id. at 2470, 2472.
108. Id. at 2473.
109. Id. at 2471.
110. Id.
Ill. Id
112. Id. at 2472. Ninety percent of parents felt that it was appropriate to discuss this topic, but
only sixty-two percent of parents were uncomfortable with the manner in which it was discussed.
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This two-part study first documented the parents' primary goal of treatment
during the parent-defined end-of-life period. After the child's death, parents were
asked what the goal should have been to ascertain if these preferences had
changed. Twenty-eight percent of participating parents reported that their
primary goal of pursuing cancer-directed therapy had been to cure cancer.
However, after their child's death, only 13% of parents still believed that the
primary goal of cancer-directed therapy should be to cure. On the other hand,
during the end-of-life period, only 13% of parents chose cancer-directed
treatment primarily for the purpose of lessening suffering. Yet after their child's
death, 34% of parents stated that this should be the primary reason for a choosing
to continue care. Finally, 15% of parents said that they based their final treatment
decisions on extending the life of their child without hope of a cure. Only 6%
felt, after their child's death, that this should be the primary goal. 114
The study then compared the physician's purpose for treatment decisions
during the patient's final month of life with the parent's purpose for treatment
decisions. Of the patients who continued to receive cancer-directed therapy
during this period, 42% of physicians reported that the purpose of the cancer-
directed treatment was to reduce suffering. 1 Yet, only 19% of parents stated
that reducing suffering was the primary goal of the treatment.116 More than half
of the parents surveyed reported that the overarching goal of therapy was to
extend life during this period, while simultaneously reporting that the purpose of
symptom management was to lessen suffering. 117 In contrast, 79% of bereaved
parents responded that the primary goal of any treatment during the end-of-life
period should be to lessen suffering.11 s
Alternatively, the study demonstrated that when both the physician and the
parent can come to a consensus about the prognosis at a minimum of fifty days
prior to death, parents are more satisfied with the quality of palliative care. 9
Thirty-seven percent of parents who met this criterion felt very prepared for the
symptoms their child experienced during the last month of life.120 Additionally,
50% of the interviewed physicians described the patient's death as very
peaceful.121 These statistics may not seem persuasive at first glance. However,
when the consensus was reached with less than fifty days remaining, only twenty
percent of parents felt prepared and only twenty-six percent of physicians stated
change in their child's appearance or behavior. Nine percent reported that this understanding came
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the death was peaceful. 122
Overall, these data suggest that the end-of-life decisions made by parents,
although they may assuage parental grief, do not help to ease the child's
suffering. These statistics may also provide evidence that parental denial is the
root of most end-of-life conflicts.
B. A Gestalt Entity: Understanding Prognosis Through Intuition and Experience
Few researchers have formally investigated the end-of-life preferences of
terminally ill adolescents. 1 23 Focusing instead on the preferences of parents
and clinicians, the patient's viewpoint went unheard in previous population-
centered research. Fortunately, the past five years have produced research
employing new methodologies, each carefully designed to elucidate this
information scientifically yet sensitively. 124 While the number of studies may
be limited, the conclusions provide invaluable insight into the heart of this
unique population. In one such study, a seventeen-year-old young man
remarked:
We've been through the main steps . . . if it was going to work, probably it
already would have worked. Stuff like the radiation, the chemo stuff, and then
the experimental chemo, and we have been through several chemos and stuff,
so I figured if it was going to slow it down or stop it, you know, it would have
done it by now. And, if it hadn't done it by now, it's just going to grow, so I
may as well be at home having fun.125
In contrast to the delay in recognition by many parents, this comment
reflects the realism many terminally ill adolescents have concerning their own
prognosis. Perhaps unique to pediatrics, these patients will often accurately
describe their prognosis even if their parents attempt to withhold the
information.127 When compared to clinically similar adults, pediatric patients are
122. Id In a similar study, a physician stated, "She would have an easier death than if we had
done a lot of manipulation with machines," when asked what influenced recommendations to
parents. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9152 (showing a general physician preference for less
invasive end-of-life care treatments).
123. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9146.
124. See, e.g., id. This study interviewed multiple adolescents, their parents, and their
physicians regarding end-of-life care decisions.
125. Id at 9150.
126. Compare Wolfe et al., supra note 105, at 2469 (arguing that considerable delay exists in
parental recognition that children have no realistic chance for cure), with Hinds et al., supra note 6,
at 9153 ("Patients [aged 10-20] in this study were able to accurately identify their treatment options
and understood that their death would be one of the outcomes of their decision.").
127. See Leslie S. Kersun & Eyal Shemesh, Depression and Anxiety in Children at the End of
Life, 54 PEDIATRIC CLINIcs N. Am. 691, 694 (2007) (noting that dying pediatric patients know
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more aware of the significance of their illness and are more perceptive to the
emotional isolation from their families. 128
Even when terminally ill pediatric patients are not included in discussions
regarding prognosis, they systematically learn about their disease through its
predictable stages, resulting in an accurate assessment of their prognosis.129 The
first stage is the recognition that the disease is serious, and is closely followed by
the second stage, the realization that medication and treatment are necessary.
The patient also learns the taboos of sickness and death, discovering this is not a
welcome topic of discussion. 131 The third stage marks an understanding of the
purposes and implications of special procedures, such as the possibility of death
from chemotherapy.132 The fourth stage is that of recognition and acceptance,
whereby patients recognize that their condition may be permanent, and
comprehend that relapses often result in death.133 The fifth and final stage brings
about the realization that there are a finite number of treatments available and
that a cure is likely not possible. 134 A child's progression through these stages
occurs irrespective of age or intelligence. Rather, the stages are determined
and defined by the patient's life experiences.136 There is substantial evidence
suggesting that an adolescent patient will consider these experiences when
making a decision regarding LSMT, and that a patient will also evaluate the
potential outcomes and the impact of this decision on others, including "loved
ones, staff, and future patients unknown to them."1
37
Research demonstrating the value of individual experiences unhinges the
strongest arguments against adolescent medical decision making.138 Critics argue
that a minor's medical decisions are based on a limited world view, are not "Part
of a well-conceived life plan," and do not account for future consequences.139 As
suggested by one psychiatrist, the reason for abridging autonomy is the
"recognition that although he may be [competent, the limitations of his
experience have] distorted his capacity for sound judgment.,,140 Lainie Ross, in
her article, Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is It in Their Best
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. WONG, supra note 30, at 295.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.; see also Kersun & Shemesh, supra note 127, at 694.
134. See WONG, supra note 30, at 295.
135. Kersun & Shemesh, supra note 127, at 694 (noting the surprising fact that a four-year-old
child "may understand more about a disease and prognosis" than a much older child).
136. Id.
137. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9152-53.
138. See id. (discussing the value of each patient's experiences and preferences).
139. Lainie Friedman Ross, Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is It in Their Best
Interest?, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41, 42 (1997).
140. Id. at 43 (quoting psychiatrist Willard Gaylin).
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Interest?, furthers this argument by stating that decision-making authority
sacrifices long-term autonomy in the name of present-day instant gratification.141
Her theory asserts that intermediate autonomy must be sacrificed in order for a
minor to eventually gain the life and decision-making experience required to
develop long-term autonomy.142 However, these arguments are inappropriate
when applied to the adolescent on a dying trajectory. Critics of adolescent
autonomy, such as Ross, appear ignorant of the fact that a terminally ill minor
does not have the opportunity to consolidate a lifetime of experiential learning
with long-term autonomy.14 A terminally ill teen's decision to forego a second
or third round of experimental chemotherapy is very different from that of the
teen refusing to seek treatment for anorexia because she cannot conceptualize the
harm she is doing to her body.144 The adolescent patient has the proven ability to
understand the prognosis after consolidating his or her experiences and can
therefore consider the outcomes of a decision in the short term (e.g., side effects
of an experimental drug), the immediate term (e.g., extending the dying
trajectory), and the longer term (e.g., dying).145 The decisions made during the
end-of-life stage are the final decisions afforded adolescent patients, and teens
will therefore employ "a lifetime's worth of experience" when making their final
choices.
III. THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ADOLESCENT DECISION
MAKING
"'[T]he experience, perspective, and power of children' [should] be taken
most seriously," wrote Dr. William G. Bartholome in the first publication of the
Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent Statement by the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) Committee on Bioethics.146 Yet nearly twenty
years later the significance of the experiences and perspectives of many
adolescents is still being questioned in the realm of medical decision making.147
Unfortunately, this has resulted in inconsistent case outcomes and irreparable
harm to the vulnerable family unit during a time of medical crises.148 This Part
outlines the current legal rights and medical perceptions of minors. Section A
141. Id. at 42-44.
142. Id. at 42.
143. Freyer, supra note 17, at 383 (criticizing Ross's theory).
144. Ross, supra note 139, at 45. Ross's example of "child liberation" run wild is that of a
fourteen-year-old diabetic who refuses insulin because her boyfriend's religious beliefs forbid the
use of medical care. Id This Note proposes that this is an ineffective example because is not a
reflection of a decision by a mature minor.
145. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9152.
146. Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric
Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314 (1995) [hereinafter AAP].
147. Derry Ridgway, Court-Mediated Disputes Between Physicians and Families Over the
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discusses the reasonableness of emancipation and the misapplication of Roper v.
Simmonsl 49 to adolescent medical decision making. This section also explains the
deficiencies of the mature minor doctrine. Section B outlines the American
Academy of Pediatrics' recommendations with respect to adolescent assent,
dissent, and consent to treatment with a curative intent.
There are ongoing, yet separate, discussions of this issue within the medical
and legal communities. 150 The medical community is largely in favor of
adolescent medical decision making.' 5 1 For example, a policy statement issued
by the American Academy of Pediatrics states that fourteen is the age at which
pediatric patients should be permitted to exercise appropriate control over their
152care. However, the legal community is more conservative, advocating for
parental authority in decision making. 153 Few courts are willing to even address
this issue, and when they do, the family is scrutinized under the media's
microscope.154
A. The Legal Restrictions - From the Impractical to the Unpredictable
1. Status-Based Exceptions
United States federal law has not created a bright-line "age of majority." In
its place, each state has created its own laws, often predicated on the political
climate, to determine when a teen gains the legal rights of an adult.155 Parens
patriae, the proactive philosophy that government ought to protect the welfare of
minors,156 has been invoked by state legislatures to justify governing many
rights, such as the legal age for driving, voting, enlisting in the armed services,
and the consumption of alcohol.1 57 The legislature also sets the age at which
parental consent is no longer needed for medical and mental health treatment.15 8
In the majority of states, a patient must be eighteen in order to consent to
149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
150. See Ridgway, supra note 147, at 896 (noting the legal community's focus on case
precedent and court assessments); see also AAP, supra note 146, at 317 (regarding the adolescent's
opinion as the determinative decision-making factor).
151. AAP, supra note 146, at 317.
152. See id.
153. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent
Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769,772 (2002).
154. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 293.
155. See Norman M. Goldfarb, Age of Consent for Clinical Research, 4 J. CLINICAL RES. BEST
PRACTICES 1, 1 (2008), http://www.firstclinical.com/journal/2008/0806 Consent Age.pdf Parens
patriae is a fluid philosophy that can fluctuate with the policy expectations of the day. See Rhonda
Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 28
AM. J. L. & MED. 409,411-12 (2002).
156. See Hartman, supra note 155, at 41 .The degree of this protection varies by political
leanings and social demands.
157. See Goldfarb, supra note 155, at 2.
158. See Hartman, supra note 155, at 419-21.
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treatment; however, some states have adopted statutory exceptions based on the
adolescent's legal status, including emancipation, personal status, and clinical
status. 159
(a) Emancipation
In certain states, a minor may become legally emancipated, or receive the
same rights as an adult, before reaching the age of majority.160 While this may
seem to be a possible avenue for securing the right to make medical decisions, a
terminally ill minor will almost never qualify for legal emancipation. The typical
emancipation process requires that the teen prove that he or she is legally married
or living physically apart and financially independent from a parent or
guardian.161 For instance, in Colorado, a minor must prove independence in
matters of care, custody, and earnings.162 In other states, the need for medical
care expressly voids emancipation.163 All told, any showing of financial
instability or living dependence on the part of the teen voids the emancipation.164
This provision is certainly problematic for the critically ill minor because even if
it were possible for the teen to be financially independent, emancipation prohibits
a parent from being a caretaker for the teen. Appreciably, when a teen is on a
dying trajectory, it is not in the best interest of the teen to rely solely on the
hospital or private nursing care as his or her end-of-life support system. For these
reasons, emancipation is not a realistic avenue for terminally ill minors to
achieve autonomy.
(b) Personal & Clinical Status Exceptions
Certain states permit a teen to consent to treatment based on his or her
159. Id at 419-20.
160. The following states do not have an emancipation statute: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin. Neither do certain counties
in Pennsylvania. Juvenile Law Center, Emancipation in the United States,
http://jlc.org.c25.sitepreviewer.com/index.php/factsheets/emancipationus (last visited Nov. 10,
2010). While emancipation typically grants the minor the same rights as an adult, a state may still
place restrictions on certain freedoms. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 129.130 (2009) (prohibiting an
emancipated minor from consuming alcohol until age twenty-one).
161. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-13-1 (LexisNexis 2010) (granting relief from disabilities when
parents are absent, insane, or dead); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.590 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-2451 (2009); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-150 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 743.015 (2009); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 577-25 (2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 750/30-7 (LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
108 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3506-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN., [Emancipation] § 3-
826.1 (LexisNexis 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-501 (2009).
162. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (2005).
163. FLA. STAT. § 743.015 (2009) (stating that emancipation requires an explanation of how
the needs of the minor with respect to medical care will be met).
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having special legal status, such as being legally married. Like emancipation,
these exceptions also vary by state and generally reflect the political climate. For
instance, in Texas, a teen can consent to medical treatment if he or she is in the
military or married because this is automatically emancipating.165 The logic
behind both the marriage- and military-status exceptions is similar: both create a
responsibility between a minor and a third party, which obviates the parent-child
relationship. 166
Interestingly, some states permit a minor to consent to medical treatment if
the minor has become a parent. Depending on the state, a minor-parent's ability
to consent to health care is defined in one of three ways: (1) a minor can consent
to the care of her child, but cannot consent to her own care unless it is pregnancy
related; 167 (2) a minor can consent to the health care of her custodial child and
for herself; or (3) a minor can consent to her own health care if she has given
birth previously.168 The third provision is the broadest, as it is not necessary that
the minor have custody of the child.
The above pregnancy-related state laws assume that minors who become
pregnant are, by default, more mature and capable of making complex decisions
than those who choose to avoid teen pregnancy. However, research shows that
teen motherhood actually restricts social and personal growth, the two tenets of
mature decision making.169 In contrast, the responsibility and emotional toll of a
terminal illness is proven to instill in the adolescent patient the ability to evaluate
options, weigh consequences, and then make a complex, multi-variable decision.
While it seems incongruous that bright-line provisions exist for teens that
give birth, these consent provisions demonstrate the inability of the legislature to
consider the intrinsic assets which more accurately signify maturity.
2. The Supreme Court as an Adolescent Psychologist
The judiciary does not often involve itself in adolescent development and
psychology. However, in 2005, the Court directly addressed adolescent maturity
and decision-making ability. In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated the juvenile death penalty on the grounds that it violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.171 The Court's
assessment of juvenile culpability eliminated the "case-by-case," or totality of
165. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 32.003, 101.003 (Vernon 2008).
166. Goldfarb, supra note 155, at 1.
167. FLA. STAT. § 743.065 (2009).
168. MINN. STAT. § 144.342 (2009).
169. See KATHLEEN STASSEN BERGER, THE DEVELOPING PERSON THROUGH CHILDHOOD AND
ADOLSCENCE 447 (2003).
170. Id.; see also Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9152-53.
171. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). This reaffirmed its prior holding that "[c]apital punishment must be
limited to those offenders . . . whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution."' Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
191
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circumstances analysis, which had been the cornerstone of previous judicial
evaluations of capacity. "In capital cases, the Constitution demands that the
punishment be tailored to both the nature of the crime itself and to the
defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt."l 72 Prior to Roper, this
required an inquiry into the "degree of harm inflicted on the victim, as well as to
the degree of the defendant's blameworthiness."'1
73
Invalidating the longstanding situational analysis, the Roper Court opined
that juvenile culpability is automatically mitigated by the three inflexible realities
of adolescent maturity: (1) adolescents are impulsive due to an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility;174 (2) adolescents are susceptible to negative influences
and peer pressure, in part because of their limited "control . . . over their . . .
environment"; 75 and (3) adolescents have incomplete character formation. In
essence, the majority held that all teenagers react and respond to situations
identically. Although multiple developmentalists have adduced evidence that an
adolescent's experiences weigh more heavily on maturity than age alone, the
Court's majority concocted a bright-line rule that maturity transforms the
moment a teen reaches his or her eighteenth birthday.177 When applied, a
seventeen-year-old high school senior, regardless of past criminal behavior,
malice, or intent, is legally of diminished mental capacity and lesser culpability;
by comparison, his eighteen-year-old codefendant is deemed to be more mature,
and therefore more culpable for the crime, despite any mitigating factors, such as
coercion by the seventeen-year-old peer to commit the crime.178 The defendant
in Roper, for example, stated that he believed he could "get away with it"
because he had not yet turned eighteen.179 This indicates that the defendant did
consider the perceived risk of punishment. so It is therefore not implausible to
172. Id. at 589; see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 111-112, (1982); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
173. Roper, 543 U.S. at 590 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815 (1982)).
174. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
175. Id.
176. Id at 572-73. These characteristics were argued in the amicus brief filed by the American
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Society for Adolescent
Psychiatry, and others. It is important to note that the argument indicated that the mental capacity is
further diminished in juvenile offenders. Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 10-16, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). For a more
comprehensive discussion, see Arshagouni, supra note 15, at 340-42.
177. Roper, 543 U.S. at 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's decision is
"premised on three perceived differences between 'adults,' who have already reached their 18th
birthdays, and 'juveniles,' who have not"). See Freyer, supra note 17, at 382 (advocating that an
adolescent's experiences are a key facet of developmental growth).
178. Roper, 543 U.S. at 600-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that the
fact that juveniles are generally less culpable for misconduct than adults does not necessarily mean
that an especially depraved seventeen year old cannot be sufficiently culpable to merit the death
penalty. Id.
179. Id.
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conclude that a manipulative seventeen-year-old could be substantially more
culpable than his or her eighteen-year-old codefendant, yet may still receive a
lesser sentence on account of his or her age.
Balancing this distinction against the Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia,
which held that the mentally retarded cannot be sentenced to capital unishment,
Roper indicates that a minor defendant is of comparable capacity. In Atkins,
the Court opined:
Because of their impairments . [such persons] by definition . have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate,
to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 182
This reasoning is strikingly similar to the three-factor justification in Roper.
As noted by Justice O'Connor in her dissent, this similar line of logic falsely
equates adolescent maturity with the "major lifelong impairments suffered by the
mentally retarded." 83 Roper's notation that the adolescent population engages in
impulsive, impetuous, and ill-considered behavior is categorically flawed
because it negates the adolescent who does demonstrate mature formal operations
and social cognition.184 This possibility alone warrants individualized scrutiny of
each teen's development, and not a general assumption that teens have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, an increased susceptibility to peer
pressure, and an incomplete personal character. 185
For these reasons, the cavil framework of Roper is not a persuasive
argument against adolescent medical decision making. First, it is well established
that terminally ill adolescents do not have an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility. 86 On the contrary, one important study showed that terminally ill
teens are often more altruistic than their healthy counterparts. This
phenomenon, referred to as the maturational effect of a life-ending illness on an
adolescent, is often manifested through a teen's conscious choice to participate in
a Phase I clinical trial because it may benefit others, even if it might cause
personal harm.188 For example, a nineteen-year-old with a solid tumor made the
following remarks about experimental chemotherapy:
181. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
182. Id. at 318.
183. Roper, 543 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 618.
185. Id. at 572-73. These characteristics were argued in the amicus brief filed by the American
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Society for Adolescent
Psychiatry (and others). It is important to note that the argument indicated that the mental capacity
is further diminished in juvenile offenders. See Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 176, at 10-16.
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If I don't take it, my family would support me, but they don't want me to quit.
Grandpa said he would worry himself to death if I don't try it. My boyfriend
wants me to take it for him. I don't want to do it but for my family. 189
The Court's second assertion, that the limited control over a teen's
environment results in an undue influence of peer pressure, is also inapplicable to
terminally ill teens. 190 Although critically ill teens are extensively limited by
their condition, the decision to continue or discontinue treatment is the most
personal way of exercising control over their intimate, physical environment. 191
When making a decision regarding treatment, the teen is often subjected to
intense peer pressure from loved ones to continue fighting.192 A willingness to
openly discuss and advocate for one's personal beliefs exhibits strength, rather
than a susceptibility to peer pressure. 193 Finally, the argument that incomplete
character formation prevents a terminally ill teen from making a mature medical
decision is an insensitive and inapt assertion. Adolescents on a dying trajectory
have complete character formation, in the sense that they are who they are right
now, and there is no opportunity for future change. This should be respectfully
considered by those questioning an adolescent's capacity for end-of-life
decisions.
3. The Mature Minor Doctrine
The mature minor doctrine is currently recognized in a limited number of
states. 194 This doctrine permits an adolescent to make a medical decision free
from parental consent if the teen can satisfy criteria both specified and evaluated
by the judiciary. The widely adopted criteria are set forth as follows:
189. Id. at 9150.
190. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
191. Cf Maureen Carroll, Transgender Youth, Adolescent Decisionmaking, and Roper v.
Simmons, 56 UCLA L. REv. 725, 746 (2009) (arguing that denying transgender adolescents'
requests for hormones diminishes their control "over the most personal and fundamental
component of their physical environment: their own bodies").
192. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9150 (noting that many patients felt that family members
would want them to continue treatment).
193. Cf Carroll, supra note 191, at 746 (noting that when transgendered teens who are
'routinely misrecognized by others' take steps to 'facilitate intra-and inter-subjective recognition
of a core (gendered) self,' their actions reflect a strong sense of that core self, not a weak response
to peer pressure").
194. Certain states have adopted some form of the mature minor doctrine. These include:
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Tennessee,
and West Virginia. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-362 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-3801 (2009);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(3) (2009); NEv. REV. STAT. § 129.030(2) (LexisNexis 2009); N.M.
STAT. § 24-7A-6.21 (2009); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (holding that a bright-line
consent restriction of eighteen is improper if it restricts the constitutional rights of mature minors);
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970); Lacey v. Laird, 139
N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987); Belcher v. Charleston




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss1/7
ADDING LIFE TO THE ADOLESCENT'S YEARS
Whether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment depends upon
the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or
judgment obtained by the minor, as well as upon the conduct and demeanor of
the minor at the time of the incident involved. Moreover, the totality of the
circumstances, the nature of the treatment and its risks or probable
consequences, and the minor's ability to appreciate the risks and consequences
are to be considered.
The seminal mature minor case, Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, advocated for both the integrity of the decision-making process and the
autonomy of the adolescent whose life was at issue.196 The Belcher court held
that when a physician is treating a "mature minor," the minor has both the right
to consent to a procedure and to elect to withhold a treatment.197 In Belcher, the
parents of muscular dystrophy patient Larry Belcher, aged seventeen years and
eight months, brought a wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice
against the medical center where Larry died.198 After a common cold
exacerbated the effects of his disease, Larry was admitted to the pediatric
intensive care unit, where he was intubated for respiratory support. 199 Larry's
parents told the physician that they did not want Larry reintubated or resuscitated
unless Larry himself requested it, and the physician had his parents sign a
progress note indicating that Larry was not to be reintubated in the event of
respiratory failure. 200 The physician then formalized the note into a "Do Not
Resuscitate" order, and although Larry could communicate and was not
cognitively impaired, he did not involve Larry in the decision.201 Larry went into
respiratory arrest the following day, and was neither reintubated nor
resuscitated.202 His parents contended, and the court agreed, that Larry should
have been consulted prior to the issuance of the "do not resuscitate" order. Thus,
the court's holding recognized the "mature minor" exception.203
Although Belcher is not the only mature minor case, and this doctrine varies
by court, Belcher uniquely captured the underlying policy of the doctrine. The
court turned a medical assumption into irreducible dicta:
195. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748. This standard was reaffirmed in the decisive mature minor
case of Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 827.
196. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992); see also Hartman, supra note 157.
197. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 836-38 (recognizing a mature minor exception to the common law
parental consent rule). The court rejected the argument that this applies only to the consent to
treatment as opposed to assent, or, affirmatively seeking treatment instead of allowing treatment to
be administered or withheld. Id.





203. Id. at 830-3 1.
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It is difficult to imagine that a young person who is under the age of majority,
yet, who has undergone medical treatment for a permanent or recurring illness
over the course of a longer period of time, may not be capable of taking part in
decisions concerning that treatment.2
In other words, the weight of this reasoning provides a legal foundation for
the argument that experience, rather than age, is a more reliable indicator of an
adolescent's ability to make medical decisions. Unfortunately, while the mature
minor doctrine is an important policy shift toward adolescent autonomy, there are
several flaws that prevent this from being a workable solution for a terminally ill
minor.
(a) The Limitations of the Mature Minor Doctrine
The mature minor doctrine is an imperfect process for determining whether
an adolescent is mature. First, not every state conducts the capacity assessment in
205
the same manner, creating a politicized conflict between state courts. For
example, a West Virginia physician can treat a minor free from liability for
failure to obtain parental consent if he or she used his or her best medical
judgment to assess the minor's maturity.206 The physician is protected because
the Belcher court concluded that the decision whether to allow a minor to make
medical decisions should be made by the patient's physician.207 However, if that
same patient were to appear before an Illinois state court, the trial judge, and not
the physician, would determine whether or not the adolescent is mature enough
to make independent medical decisions.208 Regrettably, neither approach is a
best practice for quality patient care. Under a physician-determinative standard, a
physician will be placed in the judicial and media spotlight, and he or she will
likely be second-guessed during the process.209 Additionally, because the
physician's professional obligation is to the patient and not the parent, the
promise of immunity places a significant professional burden on the treating
physician.210 On the other hand, the judicial-determinative standard may produce
204 Id. at 827.
205. Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right To
Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109 (2000) (explaining that
cases do not systematically resolve this social issue because states come to different conclusions as
to who should determine a minor's capacity).
206. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 837-38.
207. Id.
208 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989) (seventeen-year-old leukemia patient refused a
blood transfusion based on religious beliefs).
209. Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 116 (discussing the weaknesses of the mature minor
doctrine).
210. Id See also WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 304 (explaining that the physician's




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss1/7
ADDING LIFE TO THE ADOLESCENT'S YEARS
a result biased on the state's adoption of the parens patriae philosophy.211 This
is especially problematic for the minor because a minor will not have the right to
legal representation during the process unless emancipated, which is highly
unlikely, or if a physician suspects abuse.212 Equally concerning is the fact that
judges and uries lack experience in weighing the medical information presented
by experts. 13 This may lead to a decision based on a misunderstanding of facts
or one unduly influenced by the heartbreak of allowing a child to pass away.
The second problem with the doctrine's capacity assessment is its use of
irrelevant factors to measure maturity.214 Ideally, when applying the doctrine a
court should first assess a minor's competence and then determine whether any
strong countervailing interests justify circumscribing the minor's autonomy. 215
However, most courts focus on a myriad of external, unrelated factors because
they are ill-equipped to properly assess a teen's development.216 For example, in
Younts v. Saint Francis Hospital & School Of Nursing, Inc., the court weighed
the semi-conscious state of the mother, the father's unavailability, and the
mother's likely consent to the minor's surgery more heavily than the overall
217maturity of the minor. Even the seemingly well-balanced Belcher factors,
when scrutinized, favor external milestones. For instance, this analysis requires a
court to consider the ability and level of education separately from the minor's
degree of maturity. As emphasized previously, judging a terminally ill minor by
extrinsic assets penalizes the minor for the physical limitations of his or her
illness.218 Also in error, the court evaluates age rather than maturity, although
studies have proven that a terminally ill teen is often more mature than an older,
healthy peer. 19
211. Cf Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117.
212. Id. at 116 (noting that the present medical-legal system does not afford a terminally ill
minor access to an attorney or the court unless she wishes to be emancipated or is
abused/neglected).
213. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 317.
214. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right To
Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 22 (1996)
(disfavoring the courts' use of a broad-reaching factor analysis).
215. See id. (questioning whether courts actually apply a mature minor doctrine when making
a decision regarding adolescent autonomy).
216. See id.; see also WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 317 (explaining that both judges
and juries have difficulty basing decisions on technical, medical information).
217. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 338 (Kan. 1970). The
use of factors unrelated to maturity has been in place for as long as the doctrine as existed. The
Belcher court cites to the Bakker v. Welsh decision, where the court considered whether adult
relatives accompanied the minor to the physician, that the minor was near the age of majority, and
that the minor's father impliedly consented to treatment. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 836 (citing Bakker
v. Welsh, 108 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1906)).
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(b) When Parents Oppose the Minor's Right To Refuse Treatment
Even in states where the mature minor doctrine permits a teen to consent to
treatment, courts weigh heavily against the minor's right to refuse treatment if
there is any opposition from parents, guardians, adult siblings, and other
relatives.220 While the doctrine may overcome the legal presumption that a minor
is incompetent, it fails to prevail over the assumption that parents will act in the
best interest of their child.221 Courts often afford the assumption of "parent
knows best" the weight of a legal presumption.2 22 However, when parents are
faced with the imminent death of a child, their judgment is often clouded by
unspeakable grief and loss of control.223 For example, when asked about end-of-
life decisions, the mother of a fourteen-year-old end-stage cancer patient
remarked, "I am . . . prolonging the inevitable until a cure comes along . . . . I
~224
want her to be healed. I keep telling her to hold on . . . . "
This profound sense of powerlessness is often exacerbated by exhaustion
and the atmosphere in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit.225 In some instances,
other relatives or advisors may pressure parents to continue LSMT, despite the
adolescent's wishes.226 Finally, parents may choose a Phase I clinical trial to
prolong their child's life or to make their teen's life seem more meaningful,
because the loss feels so senseless otherwise.227 The following two statements
were made by the parents of end-stage cancer patients:
What my daughter goes through would be very important to another child. It's
not just to save her but children in the near future that could possibly come
down with this particular type of cancer...
Mother of a 17-year-old girl with a solid tumor228
220. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. S.Ct.1989); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202
(Me. 1990); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. App. 1992); Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 827 (W.
Va. 1992).
221. See Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117 (noting the almost automatic assumption
that, as long as physicians provide adequate information, parents will always make the best
decisions about medical care).
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Hinds et al., supra note 6, at 9151.
225. See Annette R. Pejic, Verbal Abuse: A Problem for Pediatric Nurses, 31 PEDIATRIC
NURSING 271 (2005) (noting that this type of stress is proven to reduce a parent's ability to control
emotional outbursts). These emotions also affect a parent's judgment and self-control. For example,
there is a positive correlation between the severity or unpredictability of the child's condition and
the parent's likelihood of verbally abusing a nurse or allied health professional. Id.
226. Cf Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117 (describing tensions between adolescents
who wish to refuse LSMT and parents who disagree).
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Hopefully and in someway, we will be able to get through all this and go on
with our life, but if it does not work out, we'll want someone else to benefit.
Mother of a 17-year-old girl with a brain tumor2 2 9
While most parents try to make the best possible decision regarding end-of-
life treatment, the reality is that the decision to postpone a patient's imminent and
inevitable death can greatly increase suffering. When interviewed, an eighteen-
year-old cancer patient described his reasons for discontinuing treatment, even
though there was a chance it would prolong his life:
I want to die. I just want to get it over with . . . it feels like I'm being tortured,
not tortured, not forced, they are not purposely doing this, but they might as
well just chain me up to the wall and put needles in my arms.230
Supporting this theory is a 2008 study analyzing the feelings of bereaved
parents toward end-of-life treatment options. The children of the participating
parents had undergone a median of three different treatment regimens, including
chemotherapy, radiation, and stem cell transplantation.231 The study first
interviewed parents during the tenure of their child's illness. Researchers asked
the parents to report their goals of cancer-directed therapy, first upon diagnosis
and then upon realizing that their child's cancer was terminal.232 The participants
were then contacted one year or more after their child's death and asked to
respond to a clinical vignette. The vignette assessed parents' willingness to
recommend chemotherapy to another family whose child had no realistic chance
for cure. 2 33 The study concluded that, even if they had chosen experimental
treatment for their own child, the majority of bereaved parents would not
recommend experimental treatment for incurable cancer to other similarly
234situated families. Although most parents chose additional treatment with the
goal of curing their child's cancer, the extent of patient suffering was higher than
both parents and researchers anticipated.235 The parents who felt their child had
229. Id.
230. Id. at 9150.
231. Jennifer W. Mack et al., Parents' Views of Cancer-Directed Therapy for Children With
No Realistic Chance for Cure, 26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4759, 4760 (2008). The patients in this
study "died with progressive cancer, not as a result of treatment complications." Id. at 4761.
Patients who received treatment for incurable cancer were comparable to those who did not receive
such therapy with respect to parent race, site of care, duration of disease, and duration of the end-
of-life period. Id. Interestingly, parents whose children received treatment for incurable cancer in
the end-of-life "period tended to have higher educational attainment and income" than the parents
whose children did not receive such therapy. Id. They also "used . . . a greater number of different





235. Id. at 4762-63.
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suffered without benefit reported they would not recommend this course of
treatment to the hypothetical family presented in the vignette. 236
Although inconsistent with the current legal framework, pediatric and
adolescent psychologists also recommend that the competency and motivations
of the parents be assessed if they object to a minor's refusal of LSMT.237 If the
patient expresses a difference of opinion, a parent or guardian's grief should not
overly influence the final medical judgment.238 The mature minor doctrine will
not truly be effective until minors are afforded an adult's right to consider
another person's preference for continuing LSMT-without being bound by that
preference. 239
(c) An Ill-Equipped Judiciary
Another significant problem with the mature minor provision is the costly,
disruptive, and unpredictable litigation process that it engenders.240 The side
effects of litigation can be very emotionally injurious.24 The judicial process
subjects the patient to the global media and frequently creates hostility within the
family and care team.242 In several reported legal disputes, a change in the
patient's medical status renders the court-authorized interventions inappropriate;
nevertheless, the family's integrity has already been compromised by the
relentless media attention paid to court-mediated pediatric disputes.243 In the rare
case that the judicial intervention does reach a resolution, the historical record
suggests that judges are more than willing to override a mature minor patient's
preferences.244 In a survey of fifty judicial interventions, courts acknowledged
the pediatric patients' preferences in only ten of the disputes.245 The survey also
showed a judicial disregard for the physicians' recommendations when the
disputes concerned life-threatening or disabling conditions.246 Although many of
the courts purported to apply the mature minor doctrine, the most frequently cited
reason for the decision to override the patient's choice was an interest in
236. Id at 4761-63.
237. Telephone Interview with Donna J. Follansbee, Ph.D., Research Consultant at The
Barbara Davis Center for Childhood Diabetes (Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Follansbee Interview].
238. Id (adding that the motives of a parent's refusal of LSMT must also be reviewed, as this
can occur out of exhaustion or depression).
239. See Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117.
240. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 318.
241. See Ridgway, supra note 147, at 896.
242. Id
243. Id at 896.
244. Id at 896.
245. Id at 891. "Courts acknowledged the pediatric patients' views in only 10 of the disputes
(9 of the 19 cases involving adolescents and I of the 31 cases involving children younger than 12
years)." Id.
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protecting children's health.247 One can fairly question whether this justification
is a reasonable interest or a mere political cloak, because preserving health is not
an issue if the patient is on a dying trajectory.
Further complicating the issue is the lack of reliable case precedent.248 Most
rulings made in response to physicians seeking judicial intervention to enforce
treatment for minors against the wishes of the parents do not result in court-
published opinions.249 The limited number of published opinions that address
physician-parent disputes do not adequately address the ethical, legal, and
medical issues of the case.250 Nevertheless, because so few cases exist, these
cases establish the legal precedent that shapes subsequent rulings across the
United States. When faced with a dispute, state courts often cite other state
courts, thereby creating a de facto national jurisdiction for court-mediated
pediatric disputes. 251
Litigation proceedings also place the patient's care team under the
professional microscope.2 52 Often the result of zealous reporting, this
professional scrutiny affects the physician's relationships with both colleagues
and other patients. Unlike other technical cases, where outside expert testimony
is heard during proceedings, the medical testimony in mature minor cases is
usually limited to that of the treating physician's.253 Because a trial judge and
jury lack medical proficiency, the majority of mature minor case summaries are
scientifically incomplete when published.254 Unfortunately, the resultant public
record includes inaccuracies, which are often falsely attributed to the treating
physician.25 5 This inevitable problem places a tremendous professional burden on
those physicians forced to seek a judicial intervention in order to fulfill their
ethical obligation to their patients.
B. What the Pediatric Team Knows: The Medical Community's Recommendation
The medical community has recently placed an enhanced focus on patient
and family-centered care. Unlike the legalistic approach to medical decision
making, the pediatric guidelines mandate the adolescent's involvement, as well
as an effort by clinicians to see care through the adolescent's eyes. 256 Although
parents may have the legal right to make decisions, pediatric clinicians have an
ethical obligation to afford the adolescent an opportunity to discuss his or her
247. See id.; see also Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117.
248. See Ridgway, supra note 147.
249. Id at 891.
250. Id at 895-96.
251. Id. at 896.
252. Id. at 896.
253. Id. at 895.
254. Id.
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preferences and concerns regarding care.257 This model imparts upon medical
professionals the ethical duties of fidelity and professional integrity.258 Fidelity,
the responsibility of health care professionals to place the interests of their
patients first, is at the heart of the patient-centered care model.
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has adopted a bright-line
approach to pediatric patient-centered care. 259 The AAP policy states that
pediatric patients should always be included in the decision-making process, and
remarks that "indeed, some patients have specific legal entitlements to either
consent or to refuse medical intervention."260 The AAP further states that
physicians should obtain the informed consent of an adolescent patient in the
majority of circumstances.261 However, under the current legal framework,
pediatric patients have very little opportunity to provide informed consent to
medical treatment.262 In light of these limitations, the AAP has outlined specific
guidelines for obtaining the assent of a pediatric patient.263 These guidelines are
directed at pediatric patients of all ages, and are to be modified according to age
and development:
1. Helping the patient achieve a developmentally appropriate awareness of the
nature of his or her condition.
2. Telling the patient what he or she can expect with tests and treatments.
3. Making a clinical assessment of the patient's understanding of the situation
and the factors influencing how he or she is responding (including whether
257. Id. at 896.
258. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 303-04. Professional integrity refers to the
requirement that physicians act for the benefit of all patients. Id. The obligation is typically
discussed in reference to the allocation of medical resources. Id. at 305. Although relevant, it is
beyond the narrow scope of this Note.
259. AAP, supra note 146, at 314.
260. Id The AAP states that there must be "persuasive reasons" to do otherwise. Id.
261. Id at 314-15. The AAP lists the following components as necessary in order to obtain
informed consent:
1. Provision of information: Patients should have explanations, in
understandable language, of the nature of the ailment or condition; the nature of
proposed diagnostic steps and/or treatment(s) and the probability of their
success; the existence and nature of the risks involved; and the existence,
potential benefits, and risks of recommended alternative treatments (including
the choice of no treatment).
2. Assessment of the patient's understanding of the above information.
3. Assessment, if only tacit, of the capacity of the patient or surrogate to
make the necessary decision(s).
4. Assurance, insofar as is possible, that the patient has the freedom to
choose among the medical alternatives without coercion or manipulation.
Id. at 315.
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there is inappropriate pressure to accept testing or therapy).
4. Soliciting an expression of the patient's willingness to accept the proposed
care. Regarding this final point, we note that no one should solicit a patient's
views without intending to weigh them seriously. In situations in which the
patient will have to receive medical care despite his or her objection, the
patient should be told that fact and should not be deceived. 264
The AAP has also vehemently argued that a pediatric patient, especially an
adolescent, has the full authority to refuse assent. 65 The refusal of assent, also
referred to as dissent, should carry considerable weight in the context of
participation in clinical research, and clinicians should avoid coercion in
treatment whenever possible.266 According to the AAP, an adolescent's dissent is
ethically, if not legally, binding.267
In order to successfully integrate the AAP's recommendations, the
268
patient/care team relationship must be based on trust. When the patient is
critically ill, maintaining this balance is considerably more difficult because
physicians must address palliative care without eroding hope.269 The patient and
family will benefit most from end-of-life care discussions if the physician is
skilled in facilitating this conversation.270 However, most physicians feel
unprepared and uncomfortable having any type of end-of-life discussion.
According to one survey, only two percent of pediatric oncologists report a
rotation on a palliative care service, and thus the most common palliative
experiences are of a "trial and error" nature.271 One survey suggested that some
fourth-year medical students are asked by their attending or resident physician to
"handle" dying patients because their attending or resident physician is
uncomfortable working with these patients, and is seizing the opportunity to
displace the responsibility.272 One such "student reported that he felt that his
inept and unguided effort to discuss a patient's preferences for resuscitation
'doomed' the patient to terrible, prolonged death." 27 3 However, as this behavior
is cyclical, the student will likely pass on these cases to other unprepared students
when he is finally a resident. This unstructured and unguided approach to
palliative care education places patients, families, and care teams at risk for
conflicts that are otherwise preventable. 274
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 316.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 317.
268. Kane & Hilden, supra note 12, at 188-89.
269. See Wolfe et al., supra note 105, at 2474.
270. Cf Kane & Hilden, supra note 12, at 189.
271. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 329.
272. Cf id. at 334.
273. Cf id
274. See id. at 329.
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The broader legal and medical communities need to recognize what pediatric
palliative care specialists already know: the integration of palliative care into the
pediatric medicine curriculum will reduce suffering in children who pass away,
improve the quality of life for children who survive, and reduce the number of
conflicts that end in a courtroom.275 The Committee on Palliative and End-of-
Life Care for Children and Their Families advocates that pediatric residency
programs require more extensive preparation in palliative care for those pediatric
specialists who care for children with life-threatening medical conditions.276 The
number of pediatric palliative care fellowships should also increase, as this would
bring palliative care into the mainstream, removing the discomfort and fear from
the field. 277 Moreover, continuing education programs focused on palliative care
are a simple way to provide both introductory and advanced education for all
pediatric professionals, including nurses and allied health professionals.278 These
strategies will permit a smoother incorporation of palliative care into the patient's
care plan, thereby reducing preventable conflicts and the need for judicial
intervention.
IV. IN THE TRENCHES: THE ICPC/STATUTORY COMBINATION MODEL AT WORK
The subsequent sections outline an individualized, proactive approach to
improve the adolescent medical decision-making process. Because a custom-
tailored care plan defines true patient-centered care, this Note recommends a
two-part solution incorporating the goals of the patient, their family, and their
care team.279 First, pediatric treatment centers should adopt the Individualized
Care Planning and Coordination model, and implement this protocol upon
diagnosis of a serious illness. Second, this Note advocates for legislative
involvement, encouraging state legislatures to enact a fallback statutory provision
modeled after Section 24-7A-6.1 of the New Mexico Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act.
A. The Individualized Care Planning & Coordination Model
The primary purpose of the Individualized Care Planning and Coordination
(ICPC) model is to establish a coordinated multi-disciplinary decision-making
process.280 This ICPC model is a three-step progression during which the care
team first assesses the patient's understanding of the prognosis, as well as the




279. See ICPC I, supra note 96, at 247 (noting that quality treatment requires a full spectrum
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family's comprehension of the illness trajectory.281 During Phase I, the
Relationship phase, the team elucidates the patient's personal treatment goals, as
well as their family's treatment goals.282 This comprehensive needs assessment
is then used during the second phase, which consists of a multi-disciplinary
283
negotiation of the best possible treatment plan. The individualized care plan is
designed to balance medical and personal goals, maintain family integrity, and
foster a trusting relationship among family and care team.284 The coordinated
care plan is implemented in the third and final phase. This includes an immediate
action plan and crucial follow-up assessments to ensure that the plan is meeting
the patient's needs. 285
The ICPC model functions best when implemented at diagnosis, as it creates
a strong, trust-based foundation of care.286 The model is then reinitiated if the
patient's clinical status worsens, warranting a different course of treatment. For
example, the care team reinitiates the first step if the patient's cancer relapses or
the muscular dystrophy patient becomes wheelchair or ventilator dependent.2 87
This fluidity is one of the many advantages of this model. It enables the care
team to prepare the family for loss, thereby lowering the risk of psychological
disturbance during the end-of-life and bereavement periods.288 In other words,
the patient and family may hope for the best, while preparing for the worst. 289
The following sections detail the progression of one ICPC cycle.
1. Phase I: Relationship
During the first phase, the goal is to facilitate an open dialogue between the
care team and the patient/family.290 This is a three-way conversation, as the care
team must understand the personal realities of both the patient and the family and
share the necessary information for decision making.291 The team then prepares a
comprehensive needs assessment based on the acquired information for use in the
second phase. 292
281. Id. at 246-47.
282. Id. at 248.
283. Id. at 249-50.
284. Id. at 252.
285. Id. at 251.
286. Id at 248-49.
287. Id.
288. Justin N. Baker et al., Integration of Palliative Care Practices into the Ongoing Care of
Children with Cancer: Individualized Care Planning and Coordination, 55 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 223, 240 (2008) [hereinafter ICPC II].
289. Id.
290. ICPC I, supra note 96, at 248.
291. Id
292. Id. at 249.
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(a) Empathy for the Illness Experience
St. Jude Children's Research Hospital physicians recently commented that
the ability to listen with an empathetic presence is the most powerful tool in the
clinician's arsenal.293 Because this directly affects patient and parent outcomes,
this is arguably the most important practice for mitigating avoidable conflicts. In
order to engage in effective communication and subsequently generate the needs
assessment, the clinician must appreciate the illness experience from both the
patient's perspective and from the perspective of the family.294 When talking
with the patient or family, experts recommend that the clinician be comfortable
with silence and create a safe, nonjudgmental atmosphere.295 Because the
adolescent has distinct experiences from those of the parents, this process opens
an independent discussion about each party's fears, perceptions, beliefs,
preferences, and values.296 From this, the team can anticipate and understand the
patient's and the family's coping strategies, and in so doing, prevent a crisis from
becoming a conflict. 297
(b) Candid Conversations
In order to generate a needs assessment, the clinician has the responsibility
of sharing relevant information with the patient and the family.298 As discussed
above, the sharing of negative or disappointing news can reduce the quality of the
doctor/patient relationship if handled improperly.299 The ICPC model alleviates
this problem by taking an individualized, yet structured approach. In line with the
International Pediatric Oncology Society, the model incorporates a protocol for
physicians to facilitate this discussion by including the use of exploratory
300
questions, empathetic statements, and validating responses.
During this process, it is critical that the physician identify the main
decision-maker within the family unit.301 This step will help avoid a judicial
intervention for two reasons. First, unlike the judge, the clinician is in the best
position to evaluate whether the primary decision maker has the capacity to make
293. Id at 248.
294. Id. at 248.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id at 252.
298. Id at 248.
299. Id
300. Id at 248-49. The following lists different responses recommended by clinicians to
facilitate open conversation:
"I want to listen to you tell me more about that."
"What are you hoping for now? "
"We were all hoping for a better result."
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medical decisions.302 While courts rely on the general legal definition of
competent when assessing a parent's decision-making capacity, the clinician has
the opportunity to assess the parent's ability to put aside grief in order to make a
decision that is in the best interest of the patient. 303 For example, legally
competent, educated, and medically savvy parents may still lack the emotional
capacity or clear judgment needed during their child's end-of-life period.304
Other factors, including language barriers, place of residence (i.e., whether
hometown is in a rural area with difficult hospital accessibility), or religion may
influence the way in which a family makes decisions.305 In many families,
demographic factors influence (1) which family member is the decision-maker
and (2) how that person makes medical choices.306 Once the clinician has
identified a particular family's decisive issues, a compromise is more likely to be
obtained during conflict resolution.
Second, the clinician must determine what the patient's rights are relative to
the rights of the family. 307 If the patient is at all capable of participating in
decision making, the physician should elucidate his/her preferences for treatment
and quality of life. Even if the parent states that the teen is the primary
decision-maker, the clinician must be aware of any undue family pressure placed
on the teen to make a specific decision, as this indicates the parent remains the
true decision-making force in the family.309 An understanding of family
dynamics ensures that the patient's rights and preferences are being respected to
the greatest extent possible in both ethics and the law. 310
(c) The Needs Assessment Formula
The ICPC needs assessment is the most accurate way to assess a minor's
decision-making capacity. Unlike other methods, such as the mature minor
doctrine, this assessment details a patient's needs according to the domains of his
or her personal illness experience.311 The needs assessment incorporates the
relational aspects of care with the patient's physical, social, psychological,
302. ICPC II, supra note 288, at 232.
303. See Follansbee Interview, supra note 237.
304. Derish & Heuvel, supra note 205, at 117. As evidenced in the previous section, parents
often select a treatment plan for their child in order to prolong the inevitable; however, when
interviewed after their child's death, they would not recommend the same decision to another
family. See Mack, supra note 23 1, at 4761 (stating that parents frequently stated in retrospect that
the goal of cancer treatment should be to lessen suffering).




309. See ICPC 1, supra note 96, at 249 (discussing an adolescent's concern for family when
making decisions).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 248.
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cultural, and educational needs. While this may seem like an overwhelming task,
the method is successful because the comprehensive needs assessment
incorporates feedback from an interdisciplinary team of specialists, including, but
not limited to, the medical, psychological, and social services.
The use of a comprehensive assessment negates the fear that the emotional
volatility of adolescence might lead a teen to want to discontinue LSMT,
equating this withdrawal with adolescent suicide.3 12 One of the more potent
arguments against adolescent medical decision-making stems from the
stereotypical adolescent tendency to have mood swings, feed off the dramatic,
and experience exaggerated emotions.313 However, as the needs assessment
incorporates a multidisciplinary approach, every treating service, including
psychology/psychiatry, coordinates efforts via shared documentation and
frequent meetings.314 Under the ICPC protocol, the interdisciplinary team
members include, but are not limited to, the primary physician (oncologist,
orthopedist, etc.) and the psychology, child life service, and the palliative care
.315services.
The ICPC approach differs from the typical system. In a non-ICPC setting,
services meet independently to discuss the patient's needs in relation to their
specific service. For example, a tumor board will only examine the patient's
cancerous tumors, but will not address the side effects or symptoms the patient
may be experiencing. The problem with this method is the resultant lack of
communication between the services.3 16 For example, a recent study found that
pediatric oncology care team members often underestimate adolescent
psychosocial symptoms, and as a result, the appropriate psychology consultation
is not sought.317
By contrast, the ICPC model mandates coordination between services.
During the interdisciplinary team meetings, the team reassesses the patient's
clinical condition, relational care needs, and changes in treatment goals, always
312. See Kersun & Shemesh, supra note 127, at 700 (addressing concerns that the withdrawal
of LSMT is type of teen suicide or pediatric physician assisted suicide); see also Jennifer L. Rosato,
The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors -lave a Right To Make Decisions Regarding Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 72 (1996) (differentiating and assuaging the fear that
this is the equivalent of teen suicide).
313. Allyn R. Hines & Sharon E. Paulson, Parents' and Teachers' Perceptions of Adolescent
Storm and Stress, 41 ADOLESCENCE 597, 597-98 (2006) (discussing the public perception that
adolescents are emotionally unstable, moody, and troubled). The authors reference G. Stanley
Hall's 1904 characterization of the adolescent period as one of "sturm und drang" or "storm and
stress." Id. at 597-98. One may wonder whether J.K. Rowling had this in mind when she depicted
the Durmstrang Quidditch star, Victor Krum, as moody and surly. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY
POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (2000).
314. ICPC 11, supra note 288, at 232.
315. Id. at 239.
316. Id.
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modifying the needs assessment when necessary.318 It makes possible the
immediate identification of a depressive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder,
and ensures that a true disorder will be distinguished from the expected level of
anxiety and sadness resulting from illness.319 For example, unlike the symptoms
of depression in a medically healthy person, "symptoms of anhedonia (lack of
interest in pleasurable activities) are considered to be more specific to the
diagnosis of depression in the medically ill patients and are less influenced by
medical status."320 Likewise, suicidal ideation in adolescent patients may
indicate inadequate pain management, not a genuine desire to end one's life.321
Therefore, the care team must have an understanding of the course of the
patient's illness and his or her normal coping mechanisms, in addition to
knowledge of the unique symptoms of a depressive disorder in medically ill
patients. 22 Because specialists on the ICPC interdisciplinary team share this
information on a regular basis, the care team can immediately respond if the
patient shows signs of an impending crisis. While critics of adolescent end-of-life
decision making show concern that autonomy will result in suicide, the ICPC
process ensures that suicidal ideation will not mask itself as an emotionally
healthy request to discontinue care.323 Treatment decisions are always made after
addressing the psychosocial needs of the patient and their family.324
2. Phase 2: Negotiation
The negotiation phase can begin once the team has created the needs
assessment. This next step combines prognosticating and discussing goals of care
and specific treatment options" available for the patient.325 This phase includes a
mutual discussion between the patient, family, and care team about the patient's
trajectory, medical goals, and life goals.326 The overriding objective is to reach a
318. ICPC II, supra note 288, at 234.
319. See Kersun & Shemesh, supra note 127, at 691-92 (explaining the importance of
communication and specialized training in distinguishing the two constructs of symptomatic
depression and anxiety versus a disorder).
320. Id. at 695.
321. Id. at 700. See generally NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS ch. 40 (18th ed. 2007).
322. See Kersun & Shemesh, supra note 127, at 691-92. Comparable to the mainstream
external factors for maturity, standardized symptoms of anxiety and depression do not provide an
accurate indication in a terminally ill pediatric patient. Id.
323. Id. at 700 (noting that requests for euthanasia are short-lived if handled in an empathetic
manner and the team addresses the following: depression, loneliness, and physical symptoms).
After addressing these concerns allows the care team to distinguish between a request for suicide or
a request to discontinue LSMT.
324. See ICPC II, supra note 288, at 238-39 (stating that psychosocial and spiritual needs are
consistently identified as very important to patients and their families, and psychological concerns
are frequently under addressed but should be managed as aggressively as physical symptoms).
325. ICPC I, supra note 96, at 249.
326. Id at 250-51.
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consensus regarding care that matches the patient's medical reality and personal
values system.327 The ICPC model is unique in its incorporation of case
. 328--scenarios as a demonstrative tool. Contrasting potential clinical care scenarios
aids the patient and family in assessing the possible treatment options and
329
potential outcomes. The ICPC model lessens the potential for conflict because
supportive care alternatives are always presented alongside the scenario in which
treatment with a curative intent is withdrawn.330 Research has shown that
families are more receptive to a discussion of end-of-life care when there is a
clear understanding that the goal is to lessen suffering. 331 Parents are less likely
to fear discontinuation of LSMT if they are confident that supportive care is
immediately available to help their teen reach any remaining personal goals. 332
Because the negotiation phase necessitates difficult conversations about a
patient's possible relapse or death, it is during this hase that the team will likely
encounter any discordant steps in the process. "3 Conflicts may even be
productive or beneficial in some situations, for example, when parents may
pursue an issue in disagreement rather than capitulating to a course of action and
later regretting their silence." 334 Conflict can also benefit the patient's care team,
as "overly confident or assertive clinicians may become more sensitive to
parental concerns and values." 35 However, the most severe conflicts are
destructive rather than productive, and almost always center on treatment
decisions.336 These situations commonly begin with a parent's unrealistic
expectations regarding prognosis or a patient's wish to move toward comfort care
before the parents are ready to discontinue treatment with curative intent. 337
When the needs assessment indicates that the discordance is likely to
become an insoluble conflict, the ethics committee should be consulted in an
effort to reach a resolution.338 The ethics committee's role within the ICPC is
that of moderator. 339 An effective committee is comparable to a confidential
forum used to facilitate communication, conflict resolution, and support of
327. Id at 253.
328. See id.
329. Id. at 250-51.
330. Id. at 251.
331. Id
332. Id.
333. Id. at 249.
334. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 308.
335. Id at 308.
336. Id. at 308.
337. Cf ICPC I, supra note 96, at 249-51 (discussing the challenges of moving from curative
treatment to comfort care). The shift for patients and families is gradual and uneven. Parents may
need reassurance that they have an appropriate grasp of their child's condition. Id. at 251.
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relationships.34 0 Its purpose is not to make treatment recommendations, and the
family should be reassured of this fact. 341 When the ethics committee is "sprung"
on a family, parents quickly become skeptical and hostile toward the hospital as
an institution.342 For instance, one parent remarked,
I think in particular of two times when we made a particular request and were
told that the ethics committee would be called. I'm now on the ethics
committee at Children's Hospital here and . . . [I advocate there] that ethics
committees not be viewed like the legal system. That's not helpful or open to
families but one other thing to be really frightened about. 343
Instead, the committee should be presented as a constructive and compassionate
resource for families and the medical team.344 As part of the ICPC care
coordination, families should be told of the ethics committee's existence when
they initially learn about the amenities of the treating pediatric care center. 345
Introducing the committee during the negotiation phase mitigates the fear-based
reaction that occurs when the committee is called to review a patient's case
without warning. The committee should be considered part of the care team, as a
consultation may alter the care plan during the final phase of the ICPC model.
3. Phase 3: The Individualized Care Coordination Plan Process
After arriving at a consensus approach to care through negotiation, the care
team, patient, and family can generate a comprehensive care plan.346 "The ICPC
process guides the development of a care plan that takes into account their needs,
values, and perceptions, as well as the medical care" appropriate for the patient's
illness.347 The following is an outline of the domains and the detail required to
document the plan for compliance with the model.
* Disease Management: This domain must be carefully documented, as it
includes the care plan for disease directed medical treatment, including
further use of chemotherapy, radiotherapy, and surgery. 348 This domain
also directly addresses end-of-life disease management. For example, the
patient may document whether they want to continue invasive diagnostic
procedures, even including something as basic as a blood draw for
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 293.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See ICPC 11, supra note 288, at 231 (explaining that the ethics committee promotes care
coordination and is an integral partner with the palliative care service).
346. See ICPC 1, supra note 96, at 251.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 253.
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analysis. 349 The care team will also document the patient's specific
preferences for LSMT, including ventilator support, antibiotics, kidney
dialysis, transfusions, and artificial hydration and nutrition.350 The ICPC
documentation is a proactive strategy to mitigate the atmosphere of crisis
and panic that drives many decisions about life-sustaining
interventions.351
* Physical Aspects of Care: The domain involves non-diseased-directed
physical treatment. The focus is on symptom management and
rehabilitation.352 The interdisciplinary team members include pain
management specialists and physical and occupational therapists. This
Note advocates that the team should also include a reproductive
endocrinologist because future fertility is a significant concern for newly
diagnosed cancer patients. 353 Clinicians used to overlook the fertility
implications in pediatric cancer patients.354 Fortunately, as pediatric
cancer survivor rates increase, fertility preservation is becoming an
integral part of adolescent cancer treatment. 355 Accordingly, the ICPC
349. Id. at 251.
350. Id; see also WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 298-99 (describing the most common
forms of LSMT).
351. See WHEN CHILDREN DIE, supra note 8, at 298-99 (noting that LSMT decisions are often
made in haste and panic, and this type of decision making leaves all those involved deeply
distressed).
352. See ICPC I, supra note 96, at 253.
353. See Matthew J. Loscalzo & Karen L. Clark, The Psychosocial Context of Cancer-Related
Infertility, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS 180, 182-83
(Teresa K. Woodruff & Karrie Ann Snyder eds., 2007) (recognizing the importance of fertility to
many cancer patients, and how psychosocial screening can alert physicians to patients' fertility
preservation desires); Stephanie J. Lee et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology
Recommendations on Fertility Preservation in Cancer Patients, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2917,
2921 (2006) (noting a vast majority of cancer patients treated during their reproductive years are
interested in discussing fertility preservation options). Many cancer treatments are toxic to the
reproductive organs, and cancer survivors sometimes feel "incomplete" if they become infertile.
Gregory Dolin et al., Medical Hope, Legal Pitfalls: Potential Legal Issues in the Emerging Field of
Oncofertility, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 674 (2009).
354. Cf Carrie Nieman et al., Fertility Preservation and Adolescent Cancer Patients: Lessons
from Adult Survivors of Childhood Cancer and Their Parents, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY
PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS, supra note 353, at 201, 208 (recounting how some cancer
survivors did not remember talking to their physicians about fertility concerns).
355. Cf Dolin et al., supra note 353, at 674. ("Whereas in the past fertility was not even part
of the discussion when deciding on the proper treatment, now it is a top concern of many newly
diagnosed cancer patients."). The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center offers sexuality
and fertility counseling, as well as sperm banking, as part of its Adolescent and Young Adult
Program. MD Anderson Adolescent & Young Adult (AYA) Program,
http://www.mdanderson.org/patient-and-cancer-information/care-centers-and-clinics/childrens-
cancer-hospital/support-programs/aya-program.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). The Texas
Children's Hospital Cancer Center specifically notes that psychosocial challenges of treating
teenaged patients include issues of intimacy and fertility. Texas Children's Hospital,
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care plan should include the patient's fertility preservation decision. Just
as parents are not permitted, without good cause and court approval, to
forcibly sterilize their children, it has been argued that when a parent
chooses not to consent to fertility preservation, the adolescent is deprived
of his or her right to procreate.356 Although policy, history and precedent
indicate that a minor should have full autonomy regarding fertility
357
preservation, there is no specific case law or legislation on this issue.
This makes the ICPC the optimal forum to address these issues, as the
ethics committee and hospital risk management are automatically a part
of the coordinated interdisciplinary team and can be consulted should a
conflict arise.358
* Psychological Aspects of Care: This section of the care plan documents
the patient or family's need for emotional support. 359 This includes the
previously discussed anxiety and depressive disorders, but also
incorporates grief and bereavement counseling. 360
* Spiritual Aspects of Care: Based on the information learned during the
Relationship phase, the care team will be aware of the patient's and
family's spiritual beliefs. The team will document any religious
7, 2010). Semen cryopreservation is available for post-pubescent male patients. Ovarian tissue
cryopreservation, where cortical tissue strips are obtained and re-implanted at the time of
remission, may be an option for females depending on the type of cancer. In vitro follicle
maturation is in the experimental phase. Cf Evelyn E. Telfer et al., A Two-Step Serum-Free Culture
System Supports Development of Human Oocytes from Primordial Follicles in the Presence of
Activin, 23 HUM. REPRODUCTION 1151, 1155 (2008) (reporting success of growing human follicles
from cortical strips); Min Xu et al., Tissue-Engineered Follicles Produce Live, Fertile Offspring, 12
TISSUE ENGINEERING 2739, 2739-40 (2006) (mentioning ovarian tissue cryopreservation as one
option for preserving fertility).
356. Dolin et al., supra note 353, at 698-704 (citing Kathleen M. Boozang, CAMfor Kids, I
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 109, 123 (2001) ("[A] court order is typically obtained before an
incompetent minor is sterilized . . . .")); cf Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv. v. Kirkendall,
841 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("[S]terilization is defined by the legislature as an
extraordinary measure which is to be decided by a court and undertaken only pursuant to court
order."); In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that procreation is
a fundamental right and delineating standards the state must meet to compel sterilization).
357. See Dolin et al., supra note 353, at 707-12; see also Christine Muckle, Comment, Giving
a Voice to Intersex Individuals through Hospital Ethics Committees, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 987, 1000-
01 (2006) (noting that in sterilization cases, courts do not show parents "the same level of deference
they would normally receive").
358. The issue of what to do with stored gametes/genetic material is beyond the scope of this
issue. Case law suggests that courts will look to "wishes expressed by the deceased donor during
the course of his life." Dolin et al., supra note 353, at 710; see also id at 704 (citing Hecht v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993)); Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th
1024 (Ct. App. 2008); cf Kurchner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on Hecht to conclude that frozen sperm is to be treated like personal
property).
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preferences, chaplain or clergy requests, and the family's general
definitions of hope, meaning, and faith. 361
* Social Aspects of Care: The social services department and the child
life department are actively involved in this domain. The plan should
document sibling and parent support, the patient's goals concerning self-
care and privacy, and any financial support issues the family is facing.362
* Cultural Aspects of Care: The family's cultural preferences and
customs, learned during the Relationship phase, should be documented in
the plan.363 The team should encourage continued participation in
cultural practices or holidays to preserve an atmosphere of normalcy.
* Care of the Imminently Dying: When a patient is near the end-of-life
period, the plan will document symptoms, coping, anticipatory
guidelines, communication, grief, and funeral arrangements.36 The
documentation will also include the child life team's role in end of the
life care. The child life team will help families discuss the impending
death with siblings, extended family, and friends.365 Child life specialists
also help make mementos of the child, including handprints after the
child dies.366 The care team at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital
recommends that members attend the funeral, and that the team maintain
contact with the family for thirteen months after the child's death. 367
* Ethical and Legal Aspects of Care: Every ethics consultation and risk
management involvement must be documented. 368 The plan will also
document the withholding or withdrawing of treatment with curative
intent.369
* Educational Aspects of Care: The plan should document when the
family is presented with information on anticipatory guidelines, home
health, hospice, and the dying process.370 Their comprehension level
should also be documented.
* Relational Aspects of Care: The care team should first document if the





365. Anne E. Kazak et al., Evidence-Based Assessment, Intervention and Psychosocial Care in
Pediatric Oncology: A Blueprint for Comprehensive Services Across Treatment, 32 J. PEDIATRIC
PSYCHOL. 1099, 1104 (2007).
366. Id.
367. See ICPC II, supra note 288, at 229.
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together. 371 If this is not occurring, the team can provide guided
therapeutic sessions to ensure opportunities for expression of love,
gratitude, forgiveness, and farewell. 72
* Structure of Care: Lastly, the team should document the utilization of
pediatric center resources, care coordination plans, and discharge
planning.373 An essential purpose of the ICPC plan is to "integrate
quality palliative care into the mainstream of medical treatment of all
children suffering from chronic, life-threatening, and life-limiting
illnesses, regardless of the curative intent of therapy." 374 As part of the
ICPC model's care coordination, the palliative service works with the
family throughout the course of illness, not just during the end-of-life
375period. As a result, the family and patient will experience continuity
in care during the times of crisis, such as a relapse or during the final
weeks of life.376 Without the ICPC approach, families and patients often
report feelings of abandonment during the end-of-life period, and this
complicates the grief process after the patient's death.377 Under the ICPC
care coordination practice, the family will have an established
relationship with the palliative service when curative efforts are finally
replaced by comfort measures.378 Discussions with various providers
will not have to be repeated as a result of poor physician communication.
The patient and family will receive information from a consistent, trusted
team. 379
This Note recommends one additional domain designed specifically for
adolescents: The Adolescent Advanced Directive or what Weiner et al. calls How
I Wish to Be Remembered.380 An advanced care planning document is important
for any terminally ill patient, and there is particular need for a document designed
specifically for adolescents. Based on a study conducted by physicians and
researchers at the National Institutes of Health's Pediatric Oncology and Mental
Health branches, this Note recommends that adolescent patients be provided with
an advance directive pre-tailored to document the specific planning concerns of




374. ICPC II, supra note 288, at 224-29 (explaining that the ethics committee promotes care
coordination and is an integral partner with the palliative care service).
375. Id at 234-35.
376. Id. at 228.
377. Id at 238-39.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 239.
380. See generally Lori Wiener et al., How I Wish To Be Remembered: The Use ofan Advance
Care Planning Document in Adolescent and Young Adult Populations, 11 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1309
(2008) (discussing an adolescent's need to share personal, emotional, and spiritual wishes).
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stated that the use of a directive "could be helpful" to them, the study found that
the adolescents who participated in the study were dissatisfied with the advance
directive most commonly used with adult patients.381 Participants cited both a
lack of open-ended questions and a disproportionate focus on concerns that were
of a low priority to the young adult population.382 Respondents did not consider,
for instance, concerns about assisted living, hospice, and medical record release
to be a particularly important use of the document. Other feedback included
complaints about inaccessible language. 384 For example, participants disliked the
phrase "health care agent," citing it to be unclear and impersonal. The term
"chosen responsible adult" was determined the best alternative among study
386
participants. Additionally, the respondents wanted an open-ended section that
would detail who and what they wanted around them at the end-of-life, including
friends, personal items, and music.387 This type of structured yet flexible
document will provide an excellent addition to the ICPC's patient-centered
approach when working with terminally ill adolescents.
The ICPC Model is the best preventative measure a pediatric medical center
can adopt in an effort to avert conflicts amongst patients, their families, and the
health care team. However, should an end-of-life conflict prove irresolvable, this
Note advocates that state legislatures enact a statutory fallback provision. The
following section recommends the type of legislative language best suited to
resolve an adolescent end-of-life conflict.
B. A Proposed Statutory Solution: Use ofNew Mexico's Statute
Section 24-7A-6.1 of the New Mexico Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
is an ideal forced exit to a conflict because of its specificity and consideration of
the overall illness experience. The Act reads as follows:
A. Except as otherwise provided by law, a parent or guardian of an
unemancipated minor may make that minor's health-care decisions.
B. A parent or guardian of an unemancipated minor shall have the authority to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for the unemancipated minor,
subject to the provisions of this section and the standards for surrogate
decision-making for adults provided for in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act. 388
381. Id at 1311-12.





387. Id at 1313.
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C. Subject to the provisions of Subsection B of this section, if an
unemancipated minor has capacity sufficient to understand the nature of that
unemancipated minor's medical condition, the risks and benefits of treatment
and the contemplated decision to withhold or withdraw lfe-sustaining
treatment, that unemancipated minor shall have the authority to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
D. For purposes of Subsection C of this section, a determination of the mental
and emotional capacity of an unemancipated minor shall be determined by two
qualified health-care professionals, one of whom shall be the unemancipated
minor's primary physician and the other of whom shall be a physician that
works with unemancipated minors of the minor's age in the ordinary course of
that physician's health-care practice. If the unemancipated minor lacks
capacity due to mental illness or developmental disability, one of the qualified
health-care professionals shall be a person whose training and expertise aid in
the assessment of functional impairment.
E. If the unemancipated minor's primary physician has reason to believe that a
parent or guardian of an unemancipated minor, including a non-custodial
parent, has not been informed of a decision to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, the primary physician shall make reasonable efforts to
determine if the uninformed parent or guardian has maintained substantial and
continuous contact with the unemancipated minor and, if so, shall make
reasonable efforts to notify that parent or guardian before implementing a
A. The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act does not affect the right of an
individual to make health-care decisions while having capacity to do so.
B. An individual is presumed to have capacity to make a health-care
decision, to give or revoke an advance health-care directive and to designate a
surrogate.
C. Unless otherwise specified in a written advance health- care directive, a
determination that an individual lacks or has recovered capacity or that another
condition exists that affects an individual instruction or the authority of an
agent shall be made by two qualified health-care professionals, one of whom
shall be the primary physician. If the lack of capacity is determined to exist
because of mental illness or developmental disability, one of the qualified
health-care professionals shall be a person whose training and expertise aid in
the assessment of functional impairment.
D. An individual shall not be determined to lack capacity solely on the
basis that the individual chooses not to accept the treatment recommended by a
health-care provider.
E. An individual, at any time, may challenge a determination that the
individual lacks capacity by a signed writing or by personally informing a
health-care provider of the challenge. A health-care provider who is informed
by the individual of a challenge shall promptly communicate the fact of the
challenge to the supervising health-care provider and to any health-care
institution at which the individual is receiving care. Such a challenge shall
prevail unless otherwise ordered by the court in a proceeding brought pursuant
to the provisions of [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-14 (West 2009)].
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-1 I (West 2009).
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decision.389
This is the best language for several reasons. First, an established rule is
significantly easier to apply than a common law doctrine when the issue involves
important "public policy and societal concerns." 390 Second, the New Mexico
statute is preferable because it does not automatically require judicial
intervention. As evidenced by the similarly controversial realm of adolescent
abortion, many courts are reluctant to hear cases that are politically and ethically
charged, and therefore may handle the cases improperly or reject the case
altogether. 391 In a recent survey of Texas courts' preparedness to handle the
judicial bypass proceeding available to adolescent's seeking abortion, fewer than
half met the statutory criteria.392 These courts did not acknowledge that their
office was responsible for handling the judicial bypass procedure, nor did they
disclose that a minor could have an attorney appointed for her.393 Some county
clerks stated that their court refused to handle anything regarding abortions. 394
When asked, more than two judges refused to apoint the minor an attorney,
which is her right under the Texas Family Code. Several other judges are on
record as saying that they personally do not believe in abortion and will not grant
-396
a waiver for a minor.
Although the volume of adolescent medical autonomy case law is nominal
when compared to abortion-related bypass procedures, this practiced avoidance is
389. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-6.1 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
390. In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (Sawyer, J., dissenting); see also
In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (praising a
"mature minor" doctrine); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (applying
public policy considerations).
391. See Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, "Honey, I Have No Idea ": Court Readiness To
Handle Petitions To Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 75 (2002).
392. Id. at 75-85.
393. Melissa Jacobs, Are Courts Prepared To Handle Judicial Bypass Proceedings?, 32 HUM.
RTS. J. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTs. & RESPONSIBILITIES 4, 5 (2005). The Texas Family Code requires a
court to appoint an attorney ad litem for a minor if she has not retained one herself; the hearing and
ruling must take place by 5:00 P.M. of the second business day following the application or the
waiver will be deemed granted; the court must grant the minor's request if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a "minor is mature and sufficiently well informed" to make the
abortion decision independently, or that notification would not be in her best interest, or that
notification "may lead to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor;" lastly, the court must
protect the minor's anonymity. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i)(k) (Vernon 2010).
394. Id. at 5.
395. Id. The following information was also reported: two courts stated that a guardian ad
litem would be appointed for the fetus; one stated that the petition would not be granted unless the
mother's health was in imminent danger (although the statute creates a separate exception for
emergencies); one court erroneously stated that the father of the baby had to be notified and given
twenty days to respond; and multiple courts believed that minors had to prove indigence to qualify
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nevertheless documented in published opinions. In one case, the court refused to
acknowledge the mature minor doctrine, instead deferring the task of "taking a
hard look at the mature minor doctrine for either statutory or decisional law" to
the state legislature. 3 97
The cogency and clarity of the statutory language of the New Mexico law
should be the model for other state legislatures. The New Mexico statute, unique
in its specificity, provides a roadmap for physicians, medical centers, and
families. The statute first sets forth a rule stating that an unemancipated minor
shall have the authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment if he or
she has sufficient capacity to understand the illness, the risks and benefits of
treatment, and the likely consequences of the decision.398 A provision of this
nature is not exclusive to the law of New Mexico; other states, including
Arkansas, have provisions with similar language.399 However, the New Mexico
legislature's direction on how to determine said capacity is what makes this
statute truly accessible to patients, families, and care teams in times of crisis. 400
The statute provides that emotional capacity be determined by two physicians,
one of whom is the primary physician. 4 0 1 Because this statute is recommended as
a fallback provision to the ICPC model, the treating physician will have the
benefit of thoroughly understanding a patient's maturity and comprehension of
prognosis and consequences. The physician will also be aware of the decisive
factors of the choice to withdraw or withhold LSMT. A determination of mental
and emotional capacity must also be made by a second physician that works with
similarly situated minors in the ordinary course of his practice. This incorporates
necessary checks and balances that ensure the treating physician is not
overburdened with this responsibility. 402
Combining the ICPC Model and the statutory fallback provision is a reliable
and responsible solution to the problem of adolescent patient autonomy. It
affords critically ill adolescents the autonomy many of them desire and deserve.
Perhaps most importantly, the combination preserves the family integrity,
enhances the patient's quality of life, and empowers patients to choose how they
wish to be remembered.
397. In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(granting the relief requested because it found that the patient was not a mature minor under the
circumstances, although there was much merit to the mature minor doctrine itself). The court
recommended that the NY Legislature or the appellate courts take a "hard look at the mature minor
doctrine and make it either statutory or decisional law." Id.
398. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-6.1 (West 2009).
399. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (West 2009) (stating that any unemancipated
minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed
surgical or medical treatment or procedures may make medical decisions for himself or herself).
400. See id. The extremely broad Arkansas statute gives no guidance on how to determine
"sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or
medical treatment or procedures."
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CONCLUSION
To cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always - this is our work.403
- Motto of the Palliative Care Team at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital.
Originally developed for patients undergoing stem cell transplantation, the
ICPC is ideal for patients with any illness associated with significant suffering, a
high incidence of morbidity and mortality, and the need to make frequent
difficult decisions in an ethical manner.404 The integration of the ICPC Model
with the statutory fallback provision will support teens through the no man's land
of adolescent critical illness. It ensures that the adolescent patient's relationship
with his or her family does not become collateral damage of the overall illness
experience.
Tyler Alfriend and Michael Miller are not the exception; they are the rule.
As previously noted, the family dynamic is changed when a teen is diagnosed
with a critical illness, as the teen often assumes the role of emotional caregiver to
his or her parents.4 05 Establishing an integrated approach to care first requires an
acknowledgement that the current assumptions regarding adolescent maturation
are outdated and inaccurate. Each critically ill adolescent responds differently to
illness, and the ICPC model allows the care team to see beyond the patient's age
and assess maturity on an individual basis. In the case of Michael Miller, his
oncologist admitted worrying that he would begin skateboarding as soon as he
would leave the hospital.4 06 Despite this concern, his care team looked beyond
his love of ollies and kickflips, recognizing and respecting his maturity and
positive attitude. "Michael was a joy to take care of," his physician commented.
"He was well aware of everything he was missing at home . . . but he went
through everything with a smile." 4 07 Understanding the personality of each
patient builds a stronger physician-patient relationship, and allows the patient and
family to rise above emotional set-backs.
As illustrated above, patient-tailored care will ease the heartbreak of illness,
reduce conflict, and ensure that the family feels as though the patient had the best
possible life and death. This Note demonstrates how legal and medical
professionals can work together to establish a fluid, individualized approach to
adolescent medical autonomy. The analysis proves the efficacy of the model in
diverse clinical settings and that, when implemented, it will improve the lives of
all pediatric patients facing life-threatening conditions and challenges. The three
phases of the model are a comprehensive yet compassionate approach to advance
care planning. The Relationship phase builds a center of trust between the
403. ICPC II, supra note 288, at 223.
404. Cf ICPC I, supra note 96, at 246-47.
405. Id ICPC 1, supra note 96, at 246.
406. Roll Model, supra note 4.
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patient, family, and physician. Each party has the responsibility to share relevant
information with each other and to ensure that the patient's care team can
generate a comprehensive needs assessment. The Negotiation phase allows both
the patient and the parents an opportunity to voice their concerns regarding the
care plan. During this phase, the team can bring in any specialist, including an
ethicist, to assist in resolving any discordant step in the process. Finally, the
plan's implementation ensures that the totality of the patient's needs is met by his
or her care team. Through these processes, the care team will identify
disagreements before they occur and attempt to mitigate and resolve any
conflicts. Should a problem persist, the statutory component of the combination
model permits the physician to fulfill his ethical obligations to the adolescent
patient without the fear of a public judicial intervention.
Eliminating the "no man's land" of adolescent critical illness requires
reducing emotional harm and bridging the gap between childhood and adulthood.
This Note argues that the implementation of the ICPC protocol will enhance the
adolescent patient's quality of life, reduce overall family stress, and offer an
alternative to courtroom adjudication. Because the benefits of the ICPC model
are so extensive, the ICPC structure should be implemented at any pediatric care
center that strives to provide patient-centered care.
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